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I. INTRODUCTION
Over twenty years ago, one New York court recognized that:
A computer is not a gimmick and the court should not be shy about
its use, when proper. Computers are simply mechanical tools -
receiving information and acting on instructions at lightning speed.
When the results are useful, they should be accepted, when confus-
ing, they should be rejected. What is important is that the presenta-
tion be relevant to a possible defense, that it fairly and accurately
reflect the oral testimony offered and that it be an aid to the jury's
understanding of the issue.'
The simple logic of this statement cannot be denied. As time has
progressed, however, the highly persuasive nature of computer-gener-
ated "animations," 2 coupled with the ease with which they can be
manipulated, has manifested a panoply of procedural and evidentiary
concerns incident to their use in the courtroom. This Article explores
those procedural and evidentiary issues.
As explained in the following sections, computer-generated "ani-
mations" are in a class of their own, apart from all other forms of
demonstrative aids and substantive evidence. No other courtroom tool is
so persuasive, while at the same time allowing unprecedented control
over the courtroom presentation. Real-life recreations and out-of-court
experiments are subject to the limitations innate in the physical world.
"Animations," on the other hand, can recreate the effects of an automo-
bile or plane crash not once, but multiple times, under any conceivable
condition and with views from every conceivable angle. Any attempt to
replicate such effects under "real" conditions would clearly be unrealis-
tic, both in terms of time and cost.
Computer-generated "animations" can themselves be divided into
two separate categories: demonstrative and substantive. When most
people envision a demonstrative aid, some form of static picture comes
to mind, such as a blowup of a photograph, an overhead projection of a
chart, or, in the case of medical testimony, a plastic mannequin depicting
some part of the human anatomy. This perception is not unfounded.
Demonstrative aids are generally static; they can depict only a single
1. People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721, 722-23 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
2. In the following section, a more precise definition of "animation" is developed and used
throughout the Article. Where the term "animation" is in quotations, the reference is simply to
"the technique by means of which movement is given, on film, to a series of drawings" generally.
I OXFORD ENGLISH DICIONARY 477 (2d ed. 1989).
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snapshot of information at a time. Because demonstrative "animations"
have the ability to portray a series of images over time, a single thirty-
second animation can effectively perform the function of hundreds of
these static aids. Demonstrative "animations" more than match regular
static aids in function, and they surpass static aids in persuasiveness. A
complex presentation need not be interrupted by the clumsy exchange of
one chart for the next - an "animation" portrays any series of images
seamlessly. Demonstrative "animations" have evolved so far past their
static counterparts that the current guidelines governing their use do not
adequately account for the potential problems they can generate.
Where demonstrative computer-generated "animations" have
evolved past static demonstrative aids, substantive "animations" are an
entirely new species of evidence. Using computer-generated "anima-
tions" as substantive evidence, while a relatively novel concept itself, is
very different from using simple "animations." For example, computer-
generated tests can serve as the basis for an expert opinion. A simple
computer-generated "animation," on the other hand, is merely a demon-
stration to the jury of substantive evidence in the form of moving pic-
tures. Although an expert will likely take the stand to introduce and
explain the substantive "animation," apart from anything the expert says,
the substantive "animation" is itself evidence for the jury.
The following sections lay the groundwork for what "animations"
are, how they are created, and how they make their way in front of the
jury. Part II then discusses the need for a model set of procedural guide-
lines governing the use of computer-generated "animations" at trial, as
well as addresses the evidentiary issues attendant to using "animations"
at trial. Part III includes a review of the structure of the model rules, a
proposed set of model rules of admissibility, and a detailed evaluation of
the procedural requirements involved in seeking to admit a computer-
generated "animation" at trial. Part IV evaluates the preexisting eviden-
tiary requirements that computer-generated "animations" implicate at
trial, including: hearsay, authentication, relevance, unfair prejudice, jury
instructions, special admissibility requirements for scientific evidence,
and viewing "animations" during jury deliberations, opening statements,
and closing arguments. Part V concludes with some practical guidance
regarding the decision to employ an animation or a simulation.
A. Using Computer-Generated "Animations":
Substantive Versus Demonstrative
As previously mentioned, not only do computer-generated "anima-
tions" differ from other forms of evidence, there are important distinc-
tions among "animations" themselves. In particular, an "animation" can
2007]
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be used either demonstratively or substantively. An "animation" used
for demonstrative purposes is often referred to simply as an animation,
while an "animation" used as substantive evidence is often referred to as
a simulation.3 The remainder of this Article will take on that conven-
tion. Of course, there is also the possibility that a single computer-gen-
erated exhibit can be used as both an animation and a simulation.4
A computer animation is purely demonstrative when used to illus-
trate a witness's testimony. Consequently, in this context, the animation
must be utilized in conjunction with material testimony.' In other
words, as with a diagram or any other demonstrative aid, the testifying
witness refers to the animation in explaining his or her testimony to the
jury. 6 One commentator has described computer-generated animations
as
simply computer-generated drawings assembled frame by frame
which, when viewed sequentially, produce the image of motion. The
still frames are viewed in rapid succession, usually at a speed of 24 or
30 frames per second. The image is merely a graphic representation
- a series of pictures "drawn" by a computer operator with a com-
puter - depicting a witness's testimony.7
A simulation, rather than mirroring a witness's testimony, forms a
conclusion based on raw data and is substantive evidence in and of
itself. "In a simulation, data is entered into a computer which is
programmed to analyze the information and perform calculations by
applying mathematical models, laws of physics and other scientific prin-
ciples in order to draw conclusions and recreate an incident."8 Com-
3. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1175 (Pa. 2006) (using the animation/
simulation distinction); Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 52, 68 (C.P. Ct. Lackawanna
County 2001); State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 208 (Tenn. 2001); see also Robert B. Bennett, Jr.
et al., Seeing Is Believing; Or Is It? An Empirical Study of Computer Simulations as Evidence, 34
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 257, 260 (1999); Mario Borelli, Note, The Computer as Advocate: An
Approach to Computer-Generated Displays in the Courtroom, 71 IND. L.J. 439, 450-52 (1996).
4. See Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 535 (S.C. 2000). Though not dealing with a
computer-generated animation or simulation, the court gave an example of how a piece of
evidence can be both substantive and demonstrative: "[A] bank surveillance photograph of a
robbery suspect may be classified as demonstrative evidence because it illustrates the crime scene;
however, it also may be classified as substantive evidence of the identity of the perpetrator." Id.
Another example would be an animation used demonstratively during an opening statement
(where no evidence is entered), then used as a substantive simulation during the introduction of
expert testimony.
5. See id.
6. Of course, demonstrative and substantive aids also help the judge in understanding the
testimony. However, although persuasive in bench trials as well, computer animations and
simulations are more focused on impacting the jury.
7. Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the Courtroom, the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for Institutional Reform and More Judicial Acceptance,
13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 180-81 (2000).
8. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 68.
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puter simulations may use any number of scientific principles to recreate
an event, including acceleration, gravity, friction, atmospheric pressure,
or water flow.9 The critical distinction is that, unlike an animation,
which merely reflects testimony, a simulation is the evidence presented
to the jury.' 0 During an accident recreation "simulation[,] the computer
functions in a sense as an expert itself, rendering its own opinion based
on internal calculations of how the accident would have occurred."" In
an airplane disaster case, one could use the data from the onboard flight
recorder to create a simulation of the accident for the jury."2 As one
commentator reported, in such a situation "[t]he computer itself was the
expert. It told the jury, 'given the information contained in the onboard
flight recorder, this is how the crash must have happened."" 3  Because
the simulation itself draws scientific conclusions, the computer simula-
tion will have to pass the relevant jurisdiction's scientific evidence
admissibility standards,' 4  i.e., some formulation of the Frye15 or
Daubert tests. 16
Apart from their ability to stand alone as substantive evidence,
computer-generated simulations may also provide the basis for expert
opinions.' 7 The expert will render his or her opinion based on the simu-
lation, which represents the result of any number of calculations run by a
computer program. 18
9. Id. at 68-69.
10. See, e.g., Constans v. Choctaw Transp., Inc., 97-0863, p. 47-49 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/23/
97); 712 So. 2d 885, 901.
11. Id.
12. See James E. Carbine & Lynn McLain, Proposed Model Rules Governing the
Admissibility of Computer-Generated Evidence, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
1, 3-4 (1999) (describing the computer-generated simulation of an airplane crash); Paul Marcotte,
Animated Evidence: Delta 191 Crash Re-Created Through Computer Simulations at Trial, A.B.A.
J., Dec. 1989, at 52, 54.
13. Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 4.
14. See Alice B. Lustre, Annotation, Post-Daubert Standards for Admissibility of Scientific
and Other Expert Evidence in State Courts, 90 A.L.R.5th 453 (2001) (reviewing the various
standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence in state courts). For ease of reference, the
various standards applicable to the introduction of scientific evidence will be referred to as the
"Frye/Daubert" standard for the remainder of the Article. See infra Parts III.B.4 and IV for a
more thorough discussion of the FryelDaubert issue as it relates to substantive simulations.
15. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
16. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993).
17. See Galves, supra note 7, at 185 ("[In creating a simulation,] an expert enters a
compilation of mathematical formulae or other scientific principles into the computer so that the
computer can generate a model - based on the data and scientific assumptions - that the expert
will use to form an opinion as to what must have or could have actually happened.").
18. See, e.g., Livingston v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 1473, 1492 (D. Mont. 1995)
(discussing expert testifying about results of accident reconstruction simulation); Commercial
Union Ins. Co. v. Boston Edison Co., 591 N.E.2d 165, 167-71 (Mass. 1992) (much-cited case
allowing expert to testify to results of simulation); Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d
1062, 1066-67 (Mass. 1977) (finding that, for expert to testify about results of a simulation,
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The distinction between an animation and a simulation has more to
do with its respective use and application, rather than with what it actu-
ally looks like on screen. That is to say, although an animation and a
simulation appear different only in name to a jury, the moniker of ani-
mation versus simulation entails not only differing admissibility stan-
dards, but also differing evidentiary functions.
B. Overview of Computer Animations and Simulations
and the Influence They Bring
Courts have long struggled with the admissibility of computer-gen-
erated models and the appropriateness of their use as either a purely
demonstrative exhibit or as substantive evidence.' 9 According to one
commentator, animations first appeared in the courtroom in a 1979 trial
involving an airplane crash.2" Since that time, "[c]omputer animations
have been used in the courtroom by civil litigators for reconstructing
accidents, including automobile and truck accidents, aircraft collisions,
construction equipment accidents, and industrial accidents, as well as in
patent litigation."'" Computer-generated animations have also been
used by both the prosecution and defense in criminal trials involving
vehicular homicide,22 criminally negligent child abuse,
23 and murder,24
to name just a few.
In their early history, animations and simulations were limited in
use because even a "[s]imple graphic animation could only be generated
by multi-million dollar computer systems."'26 As a result, the admissibil-
ity question did not call for an immediate comprehensive response.
Over the years, technology has evolved to the point where animation and
simulation creation is both fast and relatively inexpensive, thereby pav-
reliability standards must be met); Deffinbaugh v. Ohio Tpk. Comm'n, 588 N.E.2d 189, 194
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (finding expert properly allowed to testify as to results of simulation).
19. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1976); see also
Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 52, 63 (C.P. Ct. Lackawanna County 2001)
(commenting on Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co.).
20. Rorie Sherman, Moving Graphics: Computer Animatiok Enters Criminal Cases, NAT'L
L.J., Apr. 6, 1992, at 32 (recounting information as relayed by a representative of a computer
animation company).
21. Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806, 808 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Jennifer
Robinson Boyle, State v. Pierce: Will Florida Courts Ride the Wave of the Future and Allow
Computer Animations in Criminal Trials?, 19 NOVA L. REV. 371, 374 (1994)).
22. See, e.g., Pierce, 718 So. 2d at 806.
23. See, e.g., People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 606 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
24. See, e.g., People v. Hood, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137, 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
25. See Edward J. Bardelli, The Use of Computer Simulations in Criminal Prosecutions, 40
WAYNE L. REV. 1357, 1357 (1994).
26. Carlo D'Angelo, The Snoop Doggy Dogg Trial: A Look at How Computer Animation Will
Impact Litigation in the Next Century, 32 U.S.F. L. REv. 561, 562 (1998).
1074 [Vol. 61:1069
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ing the way for their use on a greater scale.27 Although not common
courtroom practice for most litigators, the use of animations and simula-
tions is becoming increasingly apparent.28  Litigators have begun to tap
into this invaluable resource by working with companies who exist
solely to create computer-generated animations and simulations. 29  As
production costs continue to decline, animations and simulations will
become even more prevalent,3" forcing courts to deal with the issues
attendant to their use.
The persuasive impact animations and simulations have on the jury
has driven their increased application.3" Both animations and simula-
tions "can be highly influential upon a jury, well beyond [their] reliabil-
ity and materiality, due to [their] documentary-type format presented in
27. See Boyle, supra note 21, at 372.
28. See Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 536 (S.C. 2000) ("Attempts to use computer-
generated video animations at trial, although not an everyday occurrence, are increasing."); see
also D'Angelo, supra note 26, at 562.
29. See, e.g., Jones v. Kearfott Guidance & Navigation Corp., No. CIV. 93-64(DRD), 1998
WL 1184107, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 1998) (animation created by Vigani Technical Systems, Inc.
using computer animation software called Lightwave DataLabs); Racz v. R.T. Merryman
Trucking, Inc., Civ. A. No. 92-3404, 1994 WL 124857, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1994) (animation
created by A.R.S. Associates); Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., No. 84 C 6746,
1992 WL 330356, at *1 (N.D. I11. Nov. 4, 1992) (animation created by Rockwell Graphic
Systems); Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Iowa 1994) (animation
created by Technical Medical Animation Corporation); Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. D. &
C.4th 52, 57 (C.P. Ct. Lackawanna County 2001) (animation created by 21st Century Forensic
Animations); Galves, supra note 7, at n.aal (recognizing Engineering Animation, Inc. as
providing the litigation community with computer animations since 1988); Marcotte, supra note
12 (mentioning Graphic Evidence, a division of Litigation Sciences, Forensic Technologies
International, and Schirmer Engineering Corp.).
30. Clark, 529 S.E.2d at 5936 ("Computer animation is likely to become more prevalent,
especially as the price of preparing such animations falls."); see also D'Angelo, supra note 26, at
562-63. o
31. See Racz, 1994 WL 124857, at *5 (stating that "[b]ecause the expert's conclusion would
be graphically depicted in a moving and animated form, the viewing of the computer simulation
might more readily lead the jury to accept the data and premises underlying the defendant's
expert's opinion, and, therefore, to give more weight to such opinion than it might if the jury were
forced to evaluate the expert's conclusions in the light of the testimony of all of the witnesses, as
generally occurs in such cases"); see also Lopez v. Foremost Paving, Inc., 796 S.W.2d 473, 479
(Tex. App. 1990) ("The powerful effect of videotape on jurors has been recognized."); THOMAS A.
MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 194-95 (6th ed. 2002) (referring to animations and simulations as
"powerful, persuasive tools"); 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 212 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.
1999) ("Since 'seeing is believing,' and demonstrative evidence appeals directly to the senses of
the trier of fact, it is today universally felt that this kind of evidence [demonstrative evidence
generally] possess an immediacy and reality which endow it with particularly persuasive effect.");
Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 5 ("Computer simulations and animations are exceptionally
persuasive. Judges and jurors absorb information presented in a visual format much more readily
than information presented only by the spoken word. They more easily give credibility to
televised information. If Peter Jennings says it happened, it happened.") (citations omitted)).
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a 'television' like medium."3 While "photographs can .. .transmit a
message far better than any human witness,"33 bringing those photo-
graphs to life in the form of an animation has even higher communica-
tive value. Techniques such as using animations and simulations to
improve juror comprehension and retention equate to greater persuasive-
ness in less time. 34 The average person learns more effectively by see-
ing rather than hearing, 35 hence a computer-generated animation "makes
a more lasting and intense impression on jurors than other forms of
proof. ' 36 Indeed, Americans receive most of their information through
visual media, the television being the most prevalent format.37 The tele-
vision-like appearance of animations and simulations caters to this real-
ity.38 Moreover, animations and simulations break up the monotony of a
dry trial, grabbing the jury's attention for those issues the litigator feels
are important.39
Continuing with this effective communication theme, computer-
generated animations can also be used as a tool to make potentially com-
plex and confusing expert testimony understandable to the average
juror.4n In fact, although often used to illustrate lay witness testimony,4
the majority of computer animations are used as demonstrative aids
accompanying expert testimony.42 Animations can make otherwise
32. Van Houten-Mayhard v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 89 C 0377, 1995 WL 317056, at *12
(N.D. Ill. May 23, 1995).
33. Hannewacker v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 419 So. 2d 308, 311 (Fla. 1982).
34. See Gerald J. Flintoft & Bryan Butler, Maximizing the Impact of Visual Evidence in
Patent Litigation, in 349 PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, AND LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE
HANDBOOK 429, 434-35 (1992).
35. See David W. White-Lief, Effective Demonstrative Evidence: It's Your Most Persuasive
Tool, MASS. L. WKLy., Jan. 17, 1994, at B37 (noting that "fe]ighty-five percent of all learning is
visual, compared to 10 percent for hearing, and 5 percent for the other senses combined").
36. Lopez, 796 S.W.2d at 479 (referring to videotaped evidence generally); see also White-
Lief, supra note 35, at B37 ("One study reported that jurors who received combined visual and
oral presentations retained 650 percent more information compared to jurors who received only
oral presentations."). But see Bennett et al., supra note 3, at 285 ("[T]he extraordinary
possibilities inherent in computer animations and computer simulations raised hopes - and fears -
that juries would find computer-generated displays more persuasive or convincing than other
forms of evidence. These hopes and fears seem to be unwarranted, at least within the context of
the empirical results of this study.").
37. Bruce G. Vanyo, Communicating with "Post-Literate'" Jury: Advanced Graphic Exhibits
in Patent Trials, in 349 PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS, & LITERARY PROPERTY COURSE
HANDBOOK, supra note 34, at 409, 411-12.
38. Id.
39. See Boyle, supra note 21, at 380.
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., Jones v. Kearfott Guidance & Navigation Corp., No. CIV. 93-64(DRD), 1998
WL 1184107, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 1998); Commonwealth v. Chipman, 635 N.E.2d 1204, 1210
(Mass. 1994); Commonwealth v. Shea, 644 N.E.2d 244, 244 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995).
42. See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806, 807 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Hutchison v.
Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Iowa 1994); State v. Clark, 655 N.E.2d 795,
1076
2007] COMPUTER-GENERATED "ANIMATIONS" 1077
complex, technical information understandable.43 Using programs like
AutoCAD, animations can depict a scene from any vantage point imagi-
nable. 4 A computer-generated animation "can place the jury in the
driver's seat of automobile involved in a collision, in the cockpit of an
airplane about to crash, or in the position of an eyewitness to a crime.
'4 5
In medical malpractice and personal injury cases, litigators are using
animations to illustrate how complex internal injuries occur.46 No other
medium can bring this perspective, and the accompanying empathy and
understanding, to a jury as effectively as a computer animation or
simulation.47
C. The Process of Creating a Computer-Generated
Animation or Simulation
Preparing a computer-generated animation or simulation involves
several stages. First, the litigator must decide what the animation or
simulation is to accomplish. In other words, the attorney, the forensic
animator, and any relevant witnesses (be they expert or lay) must meet
and determine the parameters of the animation or simulation.48 The
next, and perhaps most critical, step involves gathering the animation or
simulation data.49 This compilation should incorporate all relevant
801 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995); Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1174-75 (Pa. 2006); Clark v.
Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 535 (S.C. 2000);.
43. See Boyle, supra note 21, at 380-81.
44. See, e.g., Clark, 655 N.E.2d at 801-02 (reconstructing possible trajectory of bullets using
AutoCAD).
45. Kathleen M. O'Connor, Computer Animations in the Courtroom: Get with the Program,
67 FLA. B.J. 20, 20 (1993) (citing Kathlynn G. Fadely, Use of Computer-Generated Visual
Evidence in Aviation Litigation: Interactive Video Comes to Court, 55 J. AIR L. & COM. 839, 849
(1990)); see also Clark, 529 S.E.2d at 536 ("'Computer animation allows attorneys to convert
witnesses' verbal testimony into dynamic, visual demonstrations capable of mentally transporting
jurors to the scene.' ") (quoting G. Ross Anderson, Jr., Computer Animation: Admissibility and
Uses, S.C. TRIAL LAW. BULL., Fall 1995, at 9)).
46. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Iowa 1994)
(excluding an animation depicting a closed-head injury for authentication reasons); see also Andre
M. Thapedi, A.D.A.M. - The Computer Generated Cadaver: A New Development in Medical
Malpractice and Personal Injury Litigation, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 313, 313
(1995).
47. But see Datskow v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors Aircraft Prods., 826 F. Supp. 677, 685
(W.D.N.Y. 1993) ("The mere fact that this was an animated video with moving images does not
mean that the jury would have been likely to give it more weight than it would otherwise have
deserved. As one commentator has observed, '[i]f audio or visual presentation is calculated to
assist the jury, the court should not discourage the use of it .... Jurors, exposed as they are to
television, the movies, and picture magazines, are fairly sophisticated. With proper instruction,
the danger of their overvaluing such proof is slight.'") (quoting 1 JACK. B. WEINSTEIN &
MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EvIDENCE 403[51, at 403-88 (1992))).
48. See D'Angelo, supra note 26, at 563.
49. See Smith v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 01-1505, p. 5 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/28/03); 846 So. 2d
980, 983 (finding exclusion of animation proper where "information... relied upon to create the
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information (including such elements as object size, surfaces, lighting,
distances, etc.) as extracted from police and accident reports, eyewitness
testimony, expert calculations, photographs, and drawings.5" As will be
discussed in later sections, much of the concern surrounding the admis-
sibility of computer animations is based on the accuracy of the data the
animation purports to reflect. Third, the forensic animator incorporates
the data into the computer program to create a model. This includes
incorporating the data to render a model consistent with the relevant
time period. In other words, this step "controls the portrayal of how and
where an object will move throughout the animation."'" The computer
will analyze this data and generate still image frames, which are
recorded in succession on a particular medium (e.g., a DVD) to create
what appears to be a moving image.52 The fourth and final step involves
the litigator, through expert witnesses and any other appropriate wit-
nesses, proofing the animation to ensure it fairly and accurately reflects
the scene it purports to represent.53 As with gathering data, the impor-
tance of this step cannot be overstated because if an animation conflicts
with other material evidence, the court may not admit the animation.54
Furthermore, courts have excluded animations where certain critical
variables are unverifiable.55 Note, however, that creating an animation
or simulation is only the first step on the path to the jury.56
animation was inaccurate"); Cox v. State, 2001-KA-01427-SCT (Q 57) (Miss. 2003), 849 So. 2d
1257, 1273-74 (excluding computer animation because the animation was not "based on scientific,
identifiable, and objective facts"); see also D'Angelo, supra note 26, at 563-64 ("Collecting data
is one of the most important steps in producing computer animation exhibits."). Technically, in
the litigation process this set of inquires should have already been complete in terms of creating a
theory of the case. However, for the purpose of creating a computer animation, understanding the
evidence generally and understanding the evidence as it relates to what the animation will portray
are separate inquires.
50. See Boyle, supra note 21, at 375.
51. Id. at 376.
52. See id. (generally referring to this author's step three as four separate steps).
53. See D'Angelo, supra note 26, at 563.
54. See, e.g., Campoamor v. Brandon Pest Control, Inc., 721 So. 2d 333, 334 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1998) (finding error in the trial court admitting videotape interspersed with "computer-
produced animations" because "the videotape... [is] patently deceptive and prejudicial in light of
the entirety of the conflicting evidence"); State v. Famer, 66 S.W.3d 188, 210 (Tenn. 2001)
(concluding that the trial court erred in admitting computer animation of drag race where the
animation failed "to fairly and accurately illustrate and explain the [expert's] testimony").
55. See, e.g., State v. Basten, No. 97-0918-CR, 1998 WL 61129, at *18-19 (Wis. Ct. App.
Feb. 17, 1998) ("[T]he most important factor in the computer generation . . . was actually a
variable based on [witness] testimony. [With that,] [t]he [trial] court believed the video would add
little to the evidence, and was concerned that it would mislead the jury.").
56. See infra Parts III and IV for an analysis of the procedural and evidentiary concerns
attendant to using animations and simulations.
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D. Vehicles for the Introduction of Computer-Generated
Animations and Simulations
There are five basic methods a litigator may use to bring a com-
puter-generated animation or simulation in front of the jury: (1) as an
illustration of expert testimony;5 7 (2) as an illustration of lay witness
testimony;58 (3) as a simulation on which the expert has based his opin-
ion;59 (4) as a stand alone recreation introduced through the testimony of
experts involved in creating the simulation;60 and (5) as any of the pre-
ceding methods or a separate illustration of the theory of the case in
opening statements or closing arguments.6" Using animations to illus-
trate an expert's testimony is the most commonly used method.6 2 This
makes sense considering that expert testimony is often complex. Com-
bining the expert's oral testimony with a computer animation illustrating
that testimony makes for more effective communication and better
retention.63 Using animations to illustrate lay witness testimony is also a
powerful tool. An animation can put the jury in the witness's shoes by
allowing the jurors to see the events as they unfolded through the eyes of
the witness. For example, litigators have used computer animations to
illustrate an eye witness's depiction of a helicopter's flight path just
before it crashed.'
57. See, e.g., Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 424 (4th Cir. 1996); Jones v. Kearfott
Guidance & Navigation Corp., No. CIV. 93-64(DRD), 1998 WL 1184107, at *1 (D.N.J. Nov. 17,
1998); People v. Hood, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137, 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d
602, 607 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001); Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806, 807 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1997); Cleveland v. Bryant, 512 S.E.2d 360, 361 (Ga. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Sayles, 662
N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2003); Constans v. Choctaw Transp., Inc., 97-0863, p. 31 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/
23/97); 712 So. 2d 885, 900; State v. Harvey, 26613-KA, p. 5 (La. App. 2 Cir. 1/25/95); 649 So.
2d 783, 788; Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2006).
58. See, e.g., Jones, 1998 WL 1184107, at *1 (illustrating eyewitness testimony regarding
helicopter crash); see also Commonwealth v. Shea, 644 N.E.2d 244, 247-48 (Mass. App. Ct.
1995) (using regular videotaped illustration of victims' view as they were stranded in the ocean).
59. See, e.g., Livingston v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 910 F. Supp 1473, 1494-95 (D. Mont. 1995)
(allowing the introduction of a computer simulation upon which the accident reconstruction expert
based his opinion); Starr v. Campos, 655 P.2d 794, 796-97 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982) (discussing
whether expert should be permitted to testify based on results of a non-visual computer
simulation); Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d 1062, 1066-67 (Mass. 1977)
(discussing the admissibility of results of non-visual computer simulation of auto accident). Note
also that rules of evidence such as Federal Rule of Evidence 703 must be satisfied under this
scenario. See infra Part V.
60. See, e.g., Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 5 ("Expert 'testimony' is being offered by
computers. In the above example of an air crash, there was no expert witness taking the stand to
testify as to how the final moments of Flight 162 looked. The computer itself was the expert.").
61. See infra Part IV.G for a discussion of the issues attendant to the use of animations and
simulations during opening statements and closing arguments.
62. See supra note 57.
63. See supra notes 34-36.
64. See Jones v. Kearfott Guidance & Navigation Corp., No. CIV. 93-64(DRD), 1998 WL
1184107, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 1998).
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Situations three and four are similar not only in that they are the
most problematic in terms of admissibility,65 but they are also similar in
nature - so much so that, instead of considering them wholly separate
categories, they may better be thought of as opposite ends of the simula-
tion spectrum. While simulations are often a major component of testi-
mony, an expert witness will likely be used to "fill in the gaps" with
supporting testimony. In other words, an expert will rarely introduce a
simulation but fail to opine about the material the jury is viewing (i.e., a
pure situation four).
Under certain circumstances, a situation three or four simulation
can be transformed into method one. That is to say, a substantive simu-
lation can be changed into a demonstrative animation. This transforma-
tion occurs during the animation's production stage. Instead of the
expert basing her conclusions on the computer simulation's results, the
expert could manually process the information and create an animation
based on the expert's own calculations.66 Of course this method is often
impractical when dealing with large volumes of data;67 but when manual
calculation is possible and practical, using a computer-generated demon-
strative animation has the advantage of easier admissibility than using a
substantive simulation.68 Finally, using an animation during opening
statements or closing arguments helps to cement the important points a
jury will see or has seen throughout the trial.
II. THE NEED FOR MODEL GUIDELINES GOVERNING ADMISSIBILITY
A. Persuasiveness
The inordinate persuasive influence of animations and simulations
demands clearly delineated guidelines for their admissibility. Referenc-
ing motion pictures generally, one court observed "caution is required in
admitting motion pictures because, while the danger of false perspective
or of intentional fabrication exists as to both still and motion pictures,
these dangers are greater in the motion picture. ' 69 Animations and sim-
ulations are not subject to many of the practical encumbrances that
65. Simulations, in addition to fulfilling all the requirements subject to animations, are subject
to the FryelDaubert admissibility requirements for scientific evidence. See infra Part IV.F.
66. Part V infra discusses this analysis in more detail.
67. See Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Mass. 1977) (noting that
computer simulations can "perform rapidly and accurately an extensive series of computation not
readily accomplished without the use of a computer").
68. Demonstrative animations are less troublesome to admit than substantive simulations
because the computer programs creating the substantive evidence are subject to stricter reliability
requirements - i.e., the Frye/Daubert standard.
69. Lopez v. Foremost Paving, Inc., 796 S.W.2d 473, 479 (Tex. App. 1990) (quoting Cryts v.
Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683, 691 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)).
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render real-life reenactments all but impossible. For instance, actually
creating a plane crash is, among other things, prohibitively expensive.
Furthermore, laws of nature such as gravity are not included in a com-
puter animation or simulation unless the relevant data or program is
designed to reflect those conditions.70
Computer-generated animations and simulations afford a versatility
never before available. However, with this ability to account for every
conceivable variable comes an equally great potential for fabrication and
misrepresentation. 7' The proponent has control over all possible vari-
ables; thus, animations and simulations can just as easily distort poten-
tially complex issues as clarify them.7" Slight manipulations of data in
an animation may go unnoticed by court and counsel, while still retain-
ing a subtle impact on the jury. 3
B. Cost Efficiency
Important byproducts of well-defined admission guidelines include
cost efficiency in both the civil and criminal context and settlement
value in civil litigation. That is to say, in terms of cost efficiency, when
litigators know exactly what is necessary to admit either an animation or
simulation, their cost/benefit analysis is more concrete. An error result-
ing in the inadmissibility of an animation can result in a loss of
thousands of dollars in production costs.7 4 Settlement value comes not
from an increase in dollar value, but from the increased efficiency of
cases settling before trial. Where opposing litigants know with relative
certainty whether an animation or simulation is admissible, they have a
much clearer picture of the incentives and disincentives surrounding a
potential settlement. 75 Furthermore, although admissibility issues are by
70. See, e.g., Constans v. Choctaw Transp., Inc., 97-0863, p. 31 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/23/97);
712 So. 2d 885, 900 (finding no error in the admission of an animation "which admittedly did not
conform to the laws of physics or mathematics").
71. See 2 McCoRMIcK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, § 214, at 17-18 ("Motion pictures, when
they were first sought to be introduced in evidence, were frequently objected to and sometimes
excluded on the theory that they afforded manifold opportunities for fabrication and distortion.");
see also Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa 1994) (quoting 2
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 31, § 214, at 395).
72. See Boyle, supra note 21, at 382 (noting how facts can be distorted to represent a scenario
other than that which took place).
73. See What Computes in Court: Technologically Sophisticated Court Exhibits Can Raise
Some Interesting Evidentiary Issues, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 11, 1995, at Cl ("Computer-generated
exhibits ... can be modified very subtly - perhaps so subtly that it could easily escape detection
by even an eyewitness to an event.").
74. See supra note 26.
75. See Boyle, supra note 21, at 372 ("The high cost of creating an animation has not kept it
from being used in civil cases because it often leads to settlements, which are more cost effective
than trials.").
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no means subject to a bright line determination, 76 a concrete set of rules
would affirmatively answer some issues that would otherwise result in
unnecessary litigation.77 Additionally, if the cost associated with using
an animation or simulation is recoverable from the opposing party,
potential litigants will be more apt to settle.78 Overall, a set of clearly
delineated admissibility guidelines would make using animations and
simulations, and the litigation process in general, more cost efficient.79
C. Uncertainty in the Introduction of Animations and Simulations
In every trial, the parties must contend with a myriad of evidentiary
and procedural rules. Animations and simulations are of particular con-
cern because, in and of themselves, they implicate a multitude of distinct
evidentiary and procedural issues. The procedural issues include: defin-
ing what constitutes an animation or simulation, pretrial notice and dis-
closure procedures including pretrial hearings, the preservation of
animations and simulations for appellate review, and outlining the
recoverable costs associated with producing animations and simulations.
The evidentiary issues involve: hearsay, authentication, relevance, undue
prejudice, limited admissibility, and, with simulations, reliability of the
underlying scientific principles.
One court, addressing a computer-generated chart's admissibility,
opined that trial courts already have sufficient guidance to determine
computer-generated evidence's admissibility.80 This view, however,
fails to account for the stability that a model set of procedural rules
would provide at the pretrial stage, when a litigator must determine
whether to employ this type of evidence in the first instance. 8' Even
assuming a trial court can fairly and efficiently decide the evidentiary
and procedural issues without resorting to specifically tailored rules,
76. For example, animations are subject to a balancing test to determine whether their
potential probative value is outweighed by any potential unfair prejudice. See FED. R. Evm. 403.
77. The plainest example of such a rule would be a set time period before trial in which the
animation or simulation must be disclosed. See, e.g., Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 36
(suggesting a ninety-day pretrial notice requirement).
78. See infra Part III.B.6 for a discussion of a model procedural rule regarding the recovery of
costs associated with animations and simulations.
79. It is worth noting that the more regulated a process is, the higher the transaction costs
associated with employing that process. However, in this case, the costs saved by initiating
admissibility guidelines clearly exceed any increase in transaction costs.
80. See Bray v. Bi-State Dev. Co., 949 S.W.2d 93, 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) ("[T]here is a
developing consensus ... which agrees on how the accuracy of computer-generated evidence can
be established and gives a trial court sufficient parameters to exercise its discretion in this area
without the need for a precise formula.").
81. See Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 5 ("[Because animations and simulations are
complex with] enormous potential for mischief[,] . . . the fundamental issues affecting [their]
admissibility should not be decided at the time of trial.").
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without such rules litigants might be faced with the prospect of risking
thousands of dollars to create an animation whose admissibility is
uncertain.
A review of multi-jurisdictional case law can give a litigant a sense
of what procedures should be followed, but in the absence of specific
rules, the decision to employ an animation is a risky investment. Thus, a
cautious lawyer may take extra steps (i.e., spend additional money) to
ensure an animation or simulation's admissibility, resulting in a needless
expense. Even in jurisdictions where case law addresses computer-gen-
erated animations and simulations, the enunciated requirements are nec-
essarily incomplete because those decisions address only the specific
issues properly raised before them. Comprehensive guidelines would
provide a much needed admissibility roadmap for the bench and bar
alike.
I. PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROCEDURE GOVERNING THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF ANIMATIONS AND SIMULATIONS
A. The Aim of the Proposed Model Rules
Litigants are entitled to present their case in what they consider the
most effective manner possible.82 At the same time, the judiciary, both
state and federal, is under pressure to promptly and efficiently resolve
cases.83 Animations and simulations, if properly accounted for, would
help ease this tension by enabling shorter trials, while preserving, if not
increasing, the persuasiveness of the trial presentation.84 Granted,
increased animation and simulation use might not vastly decrease indi-
vidual trial times, but considered in the aggregate, the increased judicial
efficiency could prove substantial. 85 Relatedly, increased predictability
in the use of animations and simulations could encourage settlements,
further increasing judicial efficiency.86
These rules are intended to foster the introduction of fair and accu-
rate animations and simulations, without hindering their use or increas-
ing transaction costs.87 Overall, the rules serve two functions. First,
82. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186 (1997) (noting "the familiar, standard
rule that the prosecution is entitled to prove its case by evidence of its own choice").
83. See Flintoft & Butler, supra note 34, at 432 ("The crowding of the court system, plus the
need for speedy trials combine to shorten the time available for individual trials.").
84. See id. at 432-33.
85. See Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 536 (S.C. 2000) ("Computer animation is likely to
become more prevalent, especially as the price of preparing such animation falls.").
86. See Boyle, supra note 21, at 372 ("[Animations and simulations] often lead[] to
settlements, which are more cost effective than trials.").
87. Although "recent advances in technology have significantly decreased the production
costs of computer generated evidence," the high cost of creating animations and simulations may
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they provide a detailed set of parameters litigants must consider when
deciding whether to use an animation or simulation. Second, once a
litigant has made that decision, the rules provide a framework to which
litigants must adhere when using animations and simulations.
All courts addressing this issue have uniformly recognized the trial
judge's broad discretion in deciding whether to admit or exclude anima-
tions and simulations.88 These procedural rules will not interfere with
that necessarily broad discretion.8 9 Instead, the rules frame and high-
light the complex issues the trial judge must address when considering
animations and simulations. While no narrowly tailored set of rules
could possibly account for the variation and nuance that trial judges will
inevitably confront, the model rules frame the issues in the most effi-
cient format possible, while preserving the trial judge's discretion to
determine evidentiary questions. 9°
The proposed model rules address only the procedural aspects of
employing animations and simulations and would be added to the
existing rules of civil procedure. 91 The evidentiary section does not pro-
pose changing the existing rules of evidence; rather, it offers a uniform
means to apply existing rules of evidence to animations and simulations.
B. Model Rules of Procedure: Definitions, Notice, Discovery,
Hearings, Preservation of Evidence, and Recovery of Costs
The procedural matters raised by the use of animations and simula-
tions during a trial include: defining what constitutes an animation or
simulation, specifying pretrial notice and disclosure procedures, preserv-
be prohibitive for some litigants. Id. at 372. See infra Part III.B.6 for a discussion of allocating
the costs involved in the production of animations and simulations.
88. See, e.g., Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 425 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding no
undue prejudice due in the introduction of the animation and noting that in such a case "we will
not disturb the broad discretion afforded trial judges in this area"); Robinson v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 16
F.3d 1083, 1086 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding, in the context of a non-computer-generated animation,
that "[tihe admission or exclusion of evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court");
Strock v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., No. 92-2357, 1993 WL 279069, at *1 (4th Cir. July 12,
1993) (discussing admission of animation and explaining that the "court chooses to rely on the
sound discretion of trial judges who are in the best position to consider" the evidentiary issues);
State v. Sayles, 662 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2003) (finding no error in the admission of animated slides
and stating that the "[a]dmission or exclusion of demonstrative evidence rests largely within the
trial court's discretion"); Clark, 529 S.E.2d at 537 (explaining that "the trial court, as with other
evidence and testimony, has broad discretion in whether to admit a computer animation, and its
discretion will be overturned only for an abuse of discretion").
89. See FED. R. EviD. 104(a) ("Preliminary questions concerning the ... admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court.").
90. Id.
91. The procedural rules proposed here can be added directly into the rules of civil procedure.
However, constitutional concerns will not allow for all the provisions of the model rule to be
added into the rules of criminal procedure. See infra Part III.B.7.
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ing evidence, and recovery of costs. As noted previously, animations
and simulations share many procedural and evidentiary concerns.
Unless otherwise indicated, the following rules of procedure apply to
both animations and simulations.
The issues addressed in the following sections are broken down and
individually analyzed. In practice, however, because these issues are
interrelated, they would all appear sequentially within a single rule of
civil procedure, with the possible exception of the provision regarding
the recovery of costs.9"
1. DEFINITION OF ANIMATION AND SIMULATION
An important, if not elementary, first step in creating a set of model
guidelines is to define the terms of animation and simulation. The pro-
posed animation and simulation definitions are as follows:
(a) Definition - Animation and Simulation
(1) An "animation" is a computer-generated demonstrative aid
used to illustrate a witness's testimony. An animation is the
equivalent of a series of diagrams strung together to produce
what appears to be a moving image. The underlying program
creating an animation may only reproduce images as an illus-
tration. An animation may not utilize a program that
employs formulas to draw conclusions about material issues
which would, if allowed into evidence, only be admissible
through qualified expert testimony. The program may reflect
the opinions of qualified experts, but may not be used to gen-
erate those opinions. Although an animation is not substan-
tive evidence and, as such, is not entered into evidence, its
use at trial is governed by the Rules of Evidence as if it were
evidence.
(2) A "simulation" is computer-generated substantive evidence.
A simulation creates a series of diagrams strung together to
produce what appears to be a moving image. A simulation
utilizes one or more programs which, after inputting data, use
scientific formulas to produce conclusions based on that data
regarding issues material to the trial. The results produced
by a simulation's programming are equivalent in nature to
the opinions reached by an expert witness.
These definitions reflect the notion that an animation is merely a
demonstrative aid used to reflect the testimony of either an expert or a
lay witness, whereas a simulation is the equivalent of expert testimony.93
92. The proposed model rules of procedure are reproduced in their entirety infra Appendix A.
93. Part IV.A addresses possible hearsay concerns attendant to the introduction of animations
and simulations.
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The definitions typify the consensus view that has emerged from nation-
wide state and federal case law.94 As the definition indicates, anima-
tions are demonstrative in nature. As such, the primary concern is
whether the animation adequately mirrors the witness's testimony.95
Simulations involve the same issues as animations, along with added
reliability concerns. A simulation resembles expert testimony; as a
result, a simulation must satisfy of the admissibility guidelines for scien-
tific testimony in the particular jurisdiction where it is utilized.96 Not
only must the scientific principles incorporated into the simulation's
programming satisfy the Frye or Daubert reliability standards, but the
programming used to create the simulation must itself also pass those
same standards. Part IV.F contains an in-depth discussion of scientific
and programming reliability issues.
These rules do not address static demonstrative aids such as charts,
graphs, and diagrams, regardless of whether they are computer-gener-
ated.9 7 Static aids are generally admissible if they are fair and accurate,
helpful to the finder of fact in understanding material issues, and any
deficiencies are made known.98 These are much the same concerns
attendant to introducing animations and simulations, except these goals
are much simpler to attain when looking at a limited number of static
demonstrative aids.99 When an animation is introduced, it represents the
equivalent of stringing together hundreds of static aids."° Although all
demonstrative aids are similar in nature, the task of verifying the accu-
racy of each section of an animation is exponentially greater than verify-
ing the accuracy of a single static depiction. The relative ease with
which the current procedural and evidentiary rules deal with static com-
94. See, e.g., Livingston v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 1473, 1494 (D. Mont. 1995);
People v. Hood, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137, 140 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806,
808 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Cox v. State, 2001-KA-01427-SCT (Q 57) (Miss. 2003), 849
So. 2d 1257, 1273; Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1175 (Pa. 2006); Clark v. Cantrell,
529 S.E.2d 528, 535 (S.C. 2000); State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 208 (Tenn. 2001).
95. See infra Part IV.B.
96. See Livingston, 910 F. Supp. at 1494; Starr v. Campos, 655 P.2d 794, 797 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1982); Pierce, 718 So. 2d at 808; Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Boston Edison Co., 591 N.E.2d
165, 168 (Mass. 1992); Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp., 360 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Mass. 1977);
Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 71-72; Clark, 529 S.E.2d at 382 n.2.
97. See Gregory P. Joseph, A Simplified Approach to Computer-Generated Evidence and
Animations, 156 F.R.D. 327, 328 (1994) ("Exhibits of this sort today are commonly computer-
generated rather than drawn by hand.").
98. See 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 335 (2003); see also United States v. Williams, 657 F.2d
199, 203 (8th Cir. 1981).
99. See Pierce, 718 So. 2d at 809 (noting that the "fair and accurate" standard is "the same
foundation that must be established to admit any pictorial representation, be it videotape, motion
picture, or photograph").
100. See Galves, supra note 7, at 180-81.
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puter-generated aids negates the necessity of addressing them along with
animations and simulations.
Nor is it necessary to separately address so-called "real-life" recrea-
tions or experiments because their innate limitations often render them
prohibitively expensive and practically impossible - e.g., crashing a
multimillion-dollar jet airliner.' ° ' Moreover, existing case law address-
ing experiments, whether used for demonstrative or substantive pur-
poses, has proven adequate.' In dealing with experiments, the rule
employed for substantive evidence is generally known as the "substan-
tially similar" standard,10 3 while experiments used for demonstrative
purposes need not adhere as strictly to the incident at issue."0 4
Additionally, the proposed definition of simulation does not
encompass computer programs used to generate data that is not
presented to the jury as a moving image.10 5 Computer programs are
101. But see Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 425 (4th Cir. 1996) (applying the
"substantially similarity" standard to computer-generated animation and stating that "[w]e fail to
see a practical distinction.., between a real-life recreation and one generated through a computer
animation").
102. See, e.g., Robinson v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 16 F.3d 1083, 1086-87 (10th Cir. 1994) (discussing
admission of animated scale model); Gilbert v. Cosco, Inc., 989 F.2d 399, 402 (10th Cir. 1993);
Nachtsheim v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 847 F.2d 1261, 1278 (7th Cir. 1988); Lopez v. Foremost
Paving, Inc., 796 S.W.2d 473, 480 (Tex. App. 1990).
103. See Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 425; Richardson v. State Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 863 S.W.2d
876, 882 (Mo. 1993); Fort Worth & Denver Ry. Co. v. Williams, 375 S.W.2d 279, 281-82 (Tex.
1964); Horn v. Hefner, 115 S.W.3d 255, 256 (Tex. App. 2003).
104. See Gilbert, 989 F.2d at 402 (noting that "experiments which purport to recreate an
accident must be conducted under conditions similar to the accident, while experiments which
demonstrate general principles used in forming an expert's opinion are not required to adhere
strictly to the conditions of the accident").
105. Maryland is currently the only state with a rule of civil procedure specifically addressing
computer-generated evidence. See MD. RULE 2-504.3, reproduced infra app. B; see also Carbine
& McLain, supra note 12, at 46 (discussing the drafting of Maryland Rule of Civil Procedure 2-
504.3, which covers all forms of computer-generated evidence, not just animations and
simulations). The Maryland rule defines computer-generated evidence as:
(1) a computer-generated aural, visual, or other sensory depiction of an event or
thing and (2) a conclusion in aural, visual, or other sensory form formulated by a
computer program or model. The term does not encompass photographs merely
because they were taken by a camera that contains a computer; documents merely
because they were generated on a word or text processor; business, personal, or
other records or documents admissible under Rule 5-803 (b) merely because they
were generated by computer; or summary evidence admissible under Rule 5-1006,
spread sheets, or other documents merely presenting or graphically depicting data
taken directly from business, public, or other records admissible under Rules 5-
802.1 through 5-804.
MD. RULE 2-504.3(a); see also Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 32 (discussing the drafters
choice of language behind the Maryland rule). The Maryland rule was designed "to focus on
computer animations and simulations" because "[iut is that where the need for reliability is
greatest and the trial process is best served by the rule's mandatory procedures." Id. Though
similar, the definitions provided by this author attempt to integrate specificity with purpose. The
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often used to produce information solely for the purpose of either
presenting that data as evidence in static form 06 or for use solely as the
basis of an expert's opinion.0 7 For the sake of clarity, these uses are
referred to here as replications.
Because of the substantive nature of replications, they implicate all
the same reliability concerns as simulations. Yet, because they produce
only static images, replications do not implicate the admissibility con-
cerns of animations. Hence, only the evidentiary rules exclusive to sim-
ulations apply to replications. In other words, because animation and
simulation admissibility requirements overlap, one can isolate the simu-
lation-exclusive issues and apply them to replications. 108
2. PRETRIAL NOTICE
The following subsection enumerates the animation and simulation
pretrial notice requirement:
(b) Notice
(1) Except as provided for in subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) of this
Rule, any party who intends to use an animation or simula-
tion at trial for any purpose shall file a written notice no later
than ninety days before trial that contains:
(A) a statement as to whether the party intends to use an
animation or simulation;
(B) a descriptive summary of the subject matter of the ani-
mation or simulation including what the animation or
simulation intends to illustrate or prove; and
(C) a statement acknowledging that the party has the respon-
sibility to:
(i) make available any equipment or personnel neces-
sary to present the animation or simulation to the
language of the model definition proposed here is precise enough to capture what the terms
encompass without the need for enumerated exclusions.
In addition, the Maryland definition coins animations used as demonstrative aids as
"evidence," even though they are not evidence at all. Compare MD. RULE 2-504.3(a), with N.D.
& S.D. Iowa LR 83.7(h) (directing that "[t]he term 'demonstrative aid' . . . does not include
exhibits admitted into evidence"). The Maryland definition also encompasses static computer-
generated demonstrative aids, mandating that such static aids be subjected to the rule. MD. RULE
2-504.3(a). However, due to the similarity to other static aids, preexisting rules addressing
demonstrative aids are sufficient.
106. See, e.g., Bray v. Bi-State Dev. Co., 949 S.W.2d 93, 95-96 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (use of
computer program to produce a chart depicting light intensity levels).
107. See, e.g., Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 1976) (use of
computer program to determine the perfectibility of an anti-skid device).
108. Of course, this article does not address all the procedural and evidentiary issues incident
to the introduction of a replication. However, because the complexities of using replications
comes in establishing reliability, referencing replications' analogous application to simulations in
this respect is adequate.
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trial court and, when requested, any appellate court
with competent jurisdiction;
(ii) make available any equipment or personnel neces-
sary to present for review the software comprising
the simulation to the trial court and, when
requested, any appellate court with competent juris-
diction; and
(iii) preserve the animation or simulation as provided in
section (e) of this Rule.
(2) If the ninety-day deadline as prescribed in subsection (b)(1)
of this Rule has passed, a party may still use an animation or
simulation by filing written notice as provided in (b)(1)(A)-
(C) if the court finds that:
(A) notice as prescribed by (b)(1)(A)-(C) was filed as soon
as practicable;
(B) the decision to employ an animation or simulation was
made as soon as practicable; and
(C) the opposing party or parties will not be unduly
prejudiced by the introduction of the animation or simu-
lation based on the lack of a ninety-day pretrial notice
period.
(3) The notice provisions of this section need not be complied
with where a party intends to use an animation or simulation
prepared by or on behalf of a party-opponent for the purpose
of rebuttal or impeachment.
Because computer-generated animations and simulations are com-
plex and can be easily manipulated," ° litigants must have a significant
period of time to evaluate the other side's proffered animation and simu-
lation evidence.°10 Courts and commentators have recognized the neces-
sity of an adequate notice period,' and have even gone so far as to
109. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
110. See Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 5-6 ("[T]he inner workings of computer-
generated evidence are not easily understood; and it has enormous potential for mischief. For
these reasons, the fundamental issues affecting its admissibility should not be decided at the time
of trial. . . . A polished and seemingly flawless computer analysis could suffer from bad
underlying data, erroneous data entry, inaccurate software code, or invalid software design. It
might take weeks of intense study to examine the software's documentation and the data gathering
process.").
11l. See, e.g., Bray, 949 S.W.2d at 98 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that "[p]retrial disclosure
gives the opposing party an adequate opportunity to raise objections by motion in limine and to
prepare for cross-examination and rebuttal"); Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 52, 85
(C.P. Ct. Lackawanna County 2001) (ordering finalized version of animation presented to
opposing party "[a]t least 30 days" prior to trial); Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 536-37 (S.C.
2000) (noting that "late disclosure may prevent the opposing party from adequately attempting to
explain why the animation is not a fair and accurate representation"); Anderson, supra note 45, at
II (suggesting that "pretrial strategy is essential to ensure the admission of [computer animation]
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exclude animations based on a lack of notice." 2 A few jurisdictions
specifically address computer animations in their rules of civil proce-
dure,"13 but only Maryland Rule of Civil Procedure 2-504.3(b) ("Mary-
land rule") is comprehensive in terms of a well-reasoned notice
requirement specifically aimed at animations and simulations.
Subsection (b)(1) facilitates the discovery process by forcing the
animation or simulation proponent to reveal basic information about its
use. In particular, subsection (b)(1)(A) is indispensable because the
classification as either animation or simulation triggers differing eviden-
tiary concerns regarding admissibility.' 14 With no governing statement,
courts have often been forced to scrutinize the record to determine
whether they are dealing with an animation or a simulation." 5 Anima-
tions and simulations demand very different inquiries; courts and liti-
gants should not be in this uncertain position." 6 Without such
information, the ninety-day pretrial period may prove inadequate to
properly investigate the animation or simulation." 
7
Subsection (b)(2) recognizes that information prompting a litigant
to employ an animation or simulation may not materialize until after the
evidence"); Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 35-37 (commenting on MD. RuLE 2-504.3's
ninety-day notice requirement for animations and simulations).
112. See Van Houten-Mayhard v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 89-C0377, 1995 WL 317056, at *12
(N.D. I11. May 23, 1995) (granting a motion in limine seeking to exclude a computer animation
based on a lack of "timely notice" and finding that "[the opposing party] has thus been severely
prejudiced in its ability to respond to the credibility, reliability, accuracy and materiality of [the
animation]"); Richardson v. State Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 863 S.W.2d 876, 882 (Mo. 1993)
(upholding exclusion of non-computer-generated evidence based on in part on a lack of notice).
113. See E.D. Cal. L.R. 16-281(b)(5) (giving ten days prior to the final pretrial conference to
file a statement as disputed evidentiary issues, among which "computer animation" is included);
N.D. & S.D. Iowa LR 83.7(h) (instructing that all demonstrative aids, including "animations,"
must be shown to the opposing parties prior to being viewed by the jury).
114. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 71 (finding that "[t]he classification... as a simulation or an
animation also determines the evidentiary foundation which governs its admissibility").
115. See, e.g., People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 607 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (basing the
determination of whether an animation or simulation was before the court on the trial record);
Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 74 (basing the determination of whether an animation or simulation
was before the court on a review of the testimony and materials submitted by the parties); State v.
Famer, 66 S.W.3d 188, 208 (Tenn. 2001) (using the record to make the determination of whether
an animation or simulation was before the court).
116. A declaration by the proponent of the animation or simulation, of course, will not
necessarily govern the classification; the actual substance of animation or simulation controls the
classification. However, the classification by the proponent, as a practical matter, will direct the
particular type of inquiries posed by the other parties. The inquiries for an animation are wholly
included in those for simulations. In other words, a party in opposition to the introduction of a
simulation will ask all the same questions as if an animation were proffered, plus more. Thus,
where a proponent of a simulation misclassifies the simulation as an animation during the initial
notice period, the proper remedy would be to either limit its use to that of a demonstrative
animation (if possible) or exclude the simulation altogether.
117. See supra notes 71-73, 110 and accompanying text.
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ninety-day pretrial period has passed. Subsection (b)(2) aims to provide
the court the flexibility to allow litigants to use animations and simula-
tions after the ninety-day period, if the litigant can demonstrate that
notice was not practicable at an earlier date.I 8 In an effort to prevent
the exception from swallowing the rule, the litigant must demonstrate
impracticability and establish that an opposing party or parties will not
suffer undue prejudice due to the reduced notice period. As a practical
matter, due to the Frye/Daubert concerns surrounding simulations, the
prejudice from a shortened notice period may be more difficult to over-
come in the case of a simulation rather than an animation.
An optional pretrial notice waiver provision is a possibility for sim-
ple animations, but would ultimately be superfluous. Such a provision
would add needless complexity, and, due to the animation's relative sim-
plicity, abiding by the provisions of the rule should not be overly bur-
densome. Furthermore, subsection (b)(2) provides the court the
flexibility to avoid the ninety-day notice period under appropriate
circumstances.
Subsection (b)(3) recognizes that, where a proponent proffers an
animation or simulation in accordance with the preceding notice provi-
sions, the opposing party ought to be able to use that animation or simu-
lation for rebuttal or impeachment purposes. The opposing party,
however, may use the animation or simulation only for rebuttal or
impeachment purposes. Accordingly, they cannot attempt to soften the
blow by presenting the animation or simulation before the proffering
party has the chance to do so. Otherwise, the opposing party could
unfairly take advantage of the proponent's animation or simulation
investment.
The proposed model rule shares many features with its Maryland
rule counterpart.I 9 The Maryland rule also requires a ninety-day notice
period, but differs in both form and function from the rule proposed
here. Most notably, the Maryland rule does not apply to animations and
simulations used during opening statements and closing arguments.'l 0
In contrast, the proposed model rule applies to animations and simula-
tions used during opening statements and closing arguments.'
118. See Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 536-37 (S.C. 2000) (opining that "[u]ntimely
disclosure should not, standing alone, necessarily result in exclusion of the animation").
119. See MD. RULE 2-504.3(b), reproduced infra app. B.
120. Id.; see also Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 36 (discussing the reasoning behind
excluding animations used in opening statements and closing arguments from the rule).
121. See infra Part IV.G for a more thorough discussion of animations and simulations in the
context of opening statements and closing arguments.
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3. DISCOVERY
The discovery provision immediately follows subsection (b)(2)
because discovery is the next logical step once the notice provision is
satisfied:
(c) Required Disclosure; Additional Discovery
(1) Within five days after service of notice under section (b) of
this Rule, the proponent of the animation or simulation shall
make available to any party:
(A) the animation or simulation;
(B) all underlying data and scientific principles upon which
the animation or simulation is based; and
(C) reasonable access to the software used to generate the
animation or simulation.
(2) The filing of notice under section (b) of this Rule entitles any
other party to a reasonable period of time to discover any
relevant information needed to oppose the use of the anima-
tion or simulation before the court holds the hearing provided
for in section (d) of this Rule.
Section (c) complements section (b) by facilitating the opposing
party's receipt of all the relevant information necessary to formulate
possible objections before the pretrial hearing (as described in section
(d)). Providing the animation or simulation within five days of the
notice may seem somewhat onerous at first glance in that the animation
or simulation must be substantially complete at least eighty-five days
before trial. However, the complexities inherent in even the simplest
animation or simulation demand a reasonable time for discovery. 122 Not
only must the time for discovery be factored in, but the pretrial hearing
that is likely to follow must be accounted for. That is to say, opposing
parties must have sufficient time to discover any defects in the anima-
tion or simulation, and the proffering party must have sufficient time to
edit the animation or simulation if the court determines revisions must
be made.
Section (c) is similar to Maryland rule section (c) with the excep-
tion of proposed rule subsections (B) and (C).' 23 Subsection (B) clari-
fies that subsection (c)(2) covers "all underlying data and scientific
principles upon which the animation or simulation is based." Placing
this information under the section addressing required disclosure reduces
uncertainty and speeds up the discovery process. Because of this partic-
ular information's importance, any possible ambiguity is laid to rest via
explicit reference.
122. See supra notes 71-73, 110 and accompanying text.
123. See MD. RULE 2-504.3(c).
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One must possess at least a basic understanding of the software
used to create an animation or simulation in order to undertake a mean-
ingful examination of the animation or simulation's merits or deficien-
cies. Subsection (C) recognizes this necessity in light of the fact that
such software may not be readily available to other parties or may only
be available at prohibitively high costs. Placing the burden on the pro-
ponent to make the software available is one of the necessary costs asso-
ciated with using an animation or simulation.
An animation or simulation's production software usually consists
of valuable proprietary information, as undoubtedly some entity placed a
substantial investment in the development of that software.124 Subsec-
tion (C) contemplates that the only discoverable information regarding
the software is information available from a user standpoint. Opposing
parties do not need access to the software code to scrutinize an anima-
tion or simulation's reliability. For animations, the actual coding, while
arguably useful, is not the primary inquiry in determining reliability.
Animations must illustrate some other form of evidence. Thus, the pri-
mary concern regarding an animation is whether the animation suffi-
ciently mirrors the accompanying testimony; how the images were
created - i.e., the underlying code - is an ancillary concern.
With simulations, however, what they depict and how they were
created are equally important concerns from a reliability standpoint.
The simulation must accurately represent what it purports to demon-
strate and have programming that reliably produced those images. Even
so, opposing parties do not need access to the underlying software code.
Because the underlying program is subject to the Frye/Daubert admissi-
bility standard,' 25 it is incumbent on the proponent to demonstrate the
program's reliability. Establishing that reliability under Frye or Daubert
analysis, however, does not require access to the program's code.
12 6
Restricting discovery to only select code portions (in an effort to
protect proprietary interests) is untenable as the court would be entan-
gled in complex, time-consuming, costly, and ultimately unnecessary
124. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 11, 121 (2d Cir. 1976) (J. Van
Graafeiland, dissenting) (mentioning high cost of simulation perfectibility program, the results of
which were used at trial); D'Angelo, supra note 26, at 562-63 (discussing changing costs of
animation and simulation software over time).
125. See infra Part IV.F.
126. Under a Frye jurisdiction, the proponent of the simulation would have to demonstrate that
the program is generally accepted within the relevant scientific community. Frye v. United States,
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Under Daubert, the proponent proves reliability through such
factors as (1) whether the program can or has been tested; (2) whether the program has been
subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error; and (4) general
acceptance in the scientific community. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
593-94 (1993).
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technical determinations.' 27 The limited access subsection (C) provides
is the most efficient mechanism possible to both protect the software
manufacturer's proprietary interests and ensure the opposing party's
access to the information that is necessary to understand the animation
or simulation.
Subsection (c)(2) addresses other "relevant information" such as all
physical measurements, observations, physical and mathematical proper-
ties, and assumptions 2  upon which the animation or simulation is
based.129 Of course, parties are also entitled to discover how the propo-
nent gathered that information; not only must the proponent properly
enter the data into the computer, the data must be accurate. 130  For
example, in a case where an animation was used to illustrate expert testi-
mony of how a fatal shooting allegedly occurred, "the autopsy report,
firearm report, crime scene photographs and crime scene measurements"
were used to create the animation. 3' One commentator suggests "[tihe
scope of discovery should . . expressly include any deleted excerpts, or
outtakes, from any computer-generated video or exhibit, including prior
versions of any exhibit."' 3 2 To effectively evaluate a simulation or ani-
mation, the parties reviewing the animation or simulation must know
what data the proponent entered and how the proponent obtained the
data.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B) alleviates any work-
product privilege concerns regarding the underlying data. 133  Rule
26(a)(2)(B) states that when employing an expert, "the data or other
information considered by the witness in forming the opinions [and] any
exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinion" must be
disclosed. Using an animation or simulation necessarily involves using
127. Considering the complex and technical nature of the software involved, the trial judge
would likely have to employ the services of a computer expert to make this determination.
128. Different versions of animations and simulations can be utilized to illustrate expert
testimony of how an event would have or did occur if certain issues in dispute are assumed true.
See State v. Clark, 655 N.E.2d 795, 810 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (allowing expert testimony based
on AutoCAD simulation as to the possible trajectories of fatal gunshot).
129. See Cox v. State, 2001-KA-01427-SCT, 849 So. 2d 1257, 1273 (Miss. 2003) (discussing
an animation based on "pictures, investigative reports, the weapon, the crime scene, the vehicles,
etc." and acknowledging "that the animation must be based on scientific, identifiable, and
objective facts") (citing Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806, 807 (Fla 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Clark
v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 536 (S.C. 2000); State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 207-08 (Tenn. 2001)
(emphasis in original)); Pierce, 718 So. 2d at 807; Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 52,
56 (C.P. Ct. Lackawanna County 2001) (animation based on "measurements and physical
evidence").
130. See supra note 129.
131. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 57.
132. Joseph, supra note 97, at 337.
133. See Robinson v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 16 F.3d 1083, 1089 n.6 (10th Cir. 1994) (noting the
effect of the 1993 amendment on Rule 26 as facilitating discovery).
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experts. 134 Even if an animation is used to illustrate a lay witness's testi-
mony, experts must participate in the creation process. 135  As such,
where a jurisdiction has a rule similar to Federal Rule 26(a)(2)(B), the
work-product doctrine in relation to the discovery of animations and
simulations should not be an issue.
136
4. PERMISSIVE AND MANDATORY OBJECTION
PERIOD AND PRETRIAL HEARING
The section explaining the pretrial objection and hearing process
follows the discovery section:
(d) Objection Period; Hearing
(1) Within sixty days after service of notice under section (b) of
this Rule, the party:
(A) may file any objection to the use of the animation or
simulation at trial; and
(B) shall file any objection based on the assertion that the
animation or simulation does not meet the requirements
of [Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(9) or the equivalent
thereof' 37]. If not so filed, any objection based on a fail-
ure to meet the requirements of [Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 901(b)(9) or the equivalent thereof] is waived
unless excused by the court for good cause.
(2) If an objection is filed under subsection (d)(1) of this Rule,
the court shall hold a pretrial hearing on the objection. If the
hearing is an evidentiary hearing, the court may appoint an
expert to assist the court in ruling on the objection and may
assess against one or more parties the reasonable fees and
expenses of the expert. In ruling on the objection, the court
may require modification of the animation or simulation and
134. See supra Part I.C.
135. See supra Part I.C for a discussion of the animation and simulation production process.
136. See Joseph, supra note 97, at 337 ("If there ever was a viable work-product defense to
production - which is dubious in light of the good cause that the opponent could always show - it
cannot likely survive . . . [Rule] 26(a)(2)(B), which requires disclosure of 'the data or other
information considered by the witness in forming the opinions."').
137. The pertinent section of Federal Rule of Evidence 901 states:
(a) General Provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the
requirements of this rule:
(9) Process or System. Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a
result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.
FED. R. EVID. 901.
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may impose conditions relating to its use at trial. The ruling
by the court is definitive under [Federal Rule of Evidence
103(a) or the equivalent thereof'38 ]. [Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 103(a) or the equivalent thereof] governs the preserva-
tion of claims of error for appeal.
This section contemplates the resolution of most of the issues
attendant to introducing animations and simulations during the pretrial
process. 139 Because of the complexity of animations and simulations,
delaying resolution until the trial can significantly delay the process and
create difficult problems. For instance, if certain portions of an anima-
tion must be excised or revised due to, for example, an overly graphic
portrayal resulting in what the court considers undue prejudice, the ani-
mation proponent must either request a continuance or accept that the
time and money spent preparing the animation is lost.
Authentication, as it relates to the reliability of the process utilized
in production of animations and simulations, can involve intricate
issues.140 As with any item admitted into evidence, authentication
requires only that the evidence presented is what it purports to be. 1 '
However, with animations and simulations, there are several sub-issues
attendant to that determination.' 42 An animation or simulation need not
be completely exact in every detail, but the proponent must disclose any
138. Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) states:
Effect of Erroneous Ruling. - Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which
admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. - In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or
motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the
specific ground was not apparent from the context; or
(2) Offer of Proof. - In case the ruling is one excluding evidence, the substance of
the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the
context within which questions were asked.
Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding
evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of
proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal.
FED. R. EVID. 103(a). The last clause of Rule 103(a) regarding the non-necessity of renewing
objections at trial is the focus for the purposes of this subsection.
139. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LrrIATION (THIRD) § 21.446 (1995) ("Issues concerning
accuracy and reliability of computerized evidence, including necessary discovery, should be
addressed during pretrial proceedings and not raised for the first time at trial.").
140. See generally Joseph, supra note 97 (examining the basic requirements and processes for
authenticating computer-generated animations and simulations and noting unique issues raised by
animations and simulations).
141. See FED. R. EVID. 901(a); see also People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 607 (Colo. Ct. App.
2001) ("An item of demonstrative evidence is authenticated if there is evidence to support a
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it to be.").
142. See Joseph, supra note 97, at 330-36, for a detailed checklist of issues implicated in the
authentication determination for all computer-generated evidence.
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variation from what the animation or simulation purports to represent. 143
Addressing those problems at the pretrial stage alleviates complex
problems, which are not amenable to efficient resolution during the trial
process.
As the allusion to Federal Rule of Procedure 901(b)(9) makes clear,
the proposed rule does not focus on authentication in general, but on
authentication as it relates to the computerized process that created the
animation or simulation.'45 This subsection indicates that a party waives
any objection to Rule 901(b)(9) authentication if an objection is not
served within the sixty-day period.' 46 Once the parties settle this pretrial
authentication issue, trial authentication need only address whether the
animation or simulation is what it purports to be in terms of the evidence
- a problem settled by the experts involved in the creation of the anima-
tion or simulation.
147
Although both animations and simulations are subject to authenti-
cation, an important aim of subsection (d)(1) is to remedy Frye/Daubert
concerns attendant to the underlying programming of simulations prior
to trial. 4 8 At this point it is important to note the distinction between
the Frye/Daubert issue as it relates to the program and the Frye/Daubert
issue as it relates to the scientific principles upon which the program is
based. 149 Though often times inextricably linked, Rule 901(b)(9) is only
143. See Cauley, 32 P.3d at 607 ("Once authenticity is established, defects in physical
evidence go to the weight of that evidence, not its admissibility.").
144. See infra Part IV.B for an examination of what the authentication requirement entails.
145. See Bray v. Bi-State Dev. Corp., 949 S.W.2d 93, 99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (using FED. R.
EvtD. 901(b)(9) in the authentication process of computer-generated chart).
146. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LYIGATION (THIRD), supra note 139, § 21.446 (noting that
"[tihe court may order that any objections to the foundation, accuracy, or reliability of data are
deemed waived unless raised during pretrial (or good cause is shown for the failure to object)");
see also FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3) (directing that certain objections are deemed waived unless
objected to within the prescribed timeframe).
147. Those experts must be ready to testify that the animation or simulation correctly reflects
what it purports to show by testifying that all the data entered is accurate as reflected by physical
measurements, eyewitness accounts, etc., and all the data was correctly entered into the program.
See Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806, 809 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Cox v. State, 2001-KA-
01427-SCT (In[ 56-57), 849 So. 2d 1257 (Miss. 2003); Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. D. &
C.4th 52, 71-73 (C.P. Ct. Lackawanna County 2001); Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 537 (S.C.
2000).
148. If an animation meets the definition proposed in subsection (a)(1), the underlying program
would not be subject to a Frye/Daubert analysis. In essence, because an animation is only
demonstrative, the program is not creating anything that cannot be readily verified by the
underlying data (as discoverable through section (c)). Furthermore, by definition, an animation
can neither be relied on by an expert nor draw any substantive conclusions. If the animation, or
the program underlying the animation, performed either of those functions, it would cease to be an
animation and be subject to the Frye/Daubert analysis as a simulation.
149. See Joseph, supra note 97, at 333 (noting that "[t]ests governing the admissibility of
expert evidence - such as Daubert - apply ... to both: a. [t]he scientific theory underlying the
program, and b. [i]mplementation of that theory in the program").
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aimed at the former. As Part IV.F discusses, simulations are subject to
Frye/Daubert on two levels: the basic programming and the scientific
principles that the program purports to implement.'50 In other words, it
is conceivable that the program creating the simulation is overwhelm-
ingly accepted as reliable in the underlying community, yet the conclu-
sions drawn do not pass the Frye/Daubert standard because the
proponent input formulas that do not satisfy the Frye/Daubert stan-
dard.' 5 ' A Rule 901(b)(9) evaluation does not deal with this particular
contingency.
Similarly, a program may fail the Frye/Daubert analysis because of
its lack of acceptance in the relevant scientific community, even though
the science the program purports to represent is well accepted and would
easily satisfy the Frye/Daubert standard. 52 This circumstance would
fall under the ambit of subsection (d)(1). The distinction between the
two Frye/Daubert analyses can best be thought of as follows. The non-
Rule 901(b)(9) analysis deals with the reliability of the scientific process
that created the conclusion. In this instance the process is simply
embedded in a computer program. The process, as with DNA or hand-
writing matching, is extracted and analyzed under the usual Frye/
Daubert analysis. The Rule 901(b)(9) analysis deals with the reliability
of the computer program itself to accurately implement the process at
issue, regardless of what the process substantively purports to
accomplish.
Of course, a litigant may, and likely will, challenge a simulation on
both types of Frye/Daubert grounds at the pretrial hearing, but only an
150. For an example of the Frye standard being applied to separate steps in the process of
introducing evidence, see Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 270 (Fla. 1997), which notes that the
"DNA testing process consists of two distinct steps and that both steps must satisfy the
requirements of Frye."
151. An extremely basic non-simulation illustration of this possibility can be found in the
Microsoft Excel program. Excel is a highly accepted program used to create spreadsheets.
However, in displaying certain results, Excel allows the user to input formulas which the program
utilizes in creating the results. Under such a scenario, the program would be reliable, but the
formulas utilized by the program may not. This situation, while certainly the source of a viable
pretrial objection, is not the focus of subsection (d)(1).
152. One might argue that, in a jurisdiction utilizing the Frye standard, the sole factor of the
lack of acceptance of a computer program should not necessarily lead to its exclusion from
evidence. In fact, such a rule may exclude the possibility of using programs developed
exclusively for litigation. See, e.g., Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp.
1122, 1134-39 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (discussing discoverability of econometric model created for
litigation by computer experts and economics experts). However, this debate parallels the debate
over the use of Daubert over the use of Frye generally in terms of the admissibility of all scientific
evidence and is beyond the scope of this Article. The proposed rule would simply mirror the
jurisdiction's treatment of scientific evidence generally (i.e., the Frye/Daubert analysis, by




objection to the reliability of the software on Frye/Daubert grounds is
waived if not filed within sixty days after service of notice under section
(b) of the proposed rule. That is to say, regardless of whether the oppos-
ing party makes an objection at the pretrial hearing, a litigant may prop-
erly object at trial to the simulation's underlying scientific principles.'
53
By failing to lodge an objection within the sixty-day period, the oppos-
ing party waives only a Rule 901(b)(9) objection - an objection claim-
ing that the underlying program itself does not "produce[ ] an accurate
result." 
54
This section is similar to its Maryland rule counterpart. 55 The
Maryland rule also requires Rule 901(b)(9) authentication objections to
be filed within sixty days after service of notice of the intent to use
computer-generated evidence.156 The proposed rule, however, collapses
and simplifies Maryland rule sections (b) and (c) into one section.'
57
Proposed rule subsection (d)(1)'s "good cause" language was modified
to track Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3)'s language, the general
provision regarding pretrial disclosure.' 58 In addition, much of the lan-
guage contained in Maryland rule section (c) was replaced with a refer-
ence to Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a).1 59 Repeating the language of
Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) is superfluous unless, of course, the
particular jurisdiction does not have such a rule. Furthermore, explicitly
referencing the court's pretrial determination as "definitive" alleviates
any ambiguity in terms of the application of Federal Rule of Evidence
103(a).'
16
5. PRESERVATION OF EVIDENCE
Although somewhat perfunctory, the last section necessarily deals
with the preservation of computer-generated animations and
simulations:
(e) Preservation of Computer-Generated Animations and
Simulations
(1) A party offering an animation at any proceeding shall pre-
153. See infra Part IV for a framework of the evidentiary concerns attendant to (and possible
objections to) the use of animations and simulations at trial.
154. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).
155. See MD. RULE 2-504.3(b)-(c).
156. See id. at 2-504.3(d).
157. See id. at 2-504.3(b)-(c).
158. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3) (directing that "[o]bjections not so disclosed ... are waived
unless excused by the court for good cause").
159. See MD. RULE 2-504.3(c).
160. See FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2) (directing that "[o]nce the court makes a definitive ruling...
a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal")
(emphasis added)).
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serve the animation in a form suitable for transmittal as a part
of the record on appeal and furnish it to the clerk of the court.
(2) A party offering a simulation at any proceeding shall pre-
serve the simulation in a form suitable for transmittal as a
part of the record on appeal and furnish it to the clerk of the
court. That party must also preserve the software used to
generate the simulation offered in each proceeding. The
party shall give any appellate court of competent jurisdiction
access to the software as that court so requests.
This section recognizes that animation and simulation issues will
inevitably transcend the trial level. As such, the proponent must pre-
serve the animation or simulation for a potential record on appeal.' 6 '
Usually, the proponent can preserve the animation or simulation on
some conventional medium such a videotape or DVD. 6 2 Unlike the
Maryland rule,'6 3 the proposed rule creates an additional burden for the
proponent to preserve not only the product (i.e., the actual simulation),
but also the software that created the simulation. Preserving the
software is necessary because, as noted in section (d), the software itself
can be subject to evidentiary rulings. Preserving the software is not
meant to jeopardize the proprietary nature of the program; the proponent
need not disable any security measures used to prevent the program
from duplication. In fact, program access may be restricted by, for
example, an encryption program, so long as the restriction does not
affect the functioning of the program. However, in accordance with
model rule subsection (b)(1)(C)(ii), a party representative proffering the
simulation must be available to present the program to the court. The
proponent need only make the program available at trial or for appellate
review if and when the parties properly raise an issue implicating the
program.
6. ANIMATIONS AND SIMULATIONS AS REASONABLE COSTS
RECOVERABLE IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES
Many jurisdictions have rules of civil procedure allowing the pre-
vailing party to recover costs under certain circumstances."6' Accompa-
161. See, e.g., Bledsoe v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 880 P.2d 689, 692 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1994) (court viewed videotape of animation before determining that the trial court erred in
allowing the jury to view it); Commonwealth v. Shea, 644 N.E.2d 244, 248 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995)
(appeals court viewed non-computer-generated videotape in the course of deciding whether
admission was error).
162. See, e.g., Bledsoe, 880 P.2d at 692; Shea, 644 N.E.2d at 248.
163. MD. RULE 2-504.3(0.
164. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1) ("Except when express provision therefor is made
either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs other than attorneys' fees shall be
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs."); CAL. CODE. CIV.
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nying those rules, either in a companion rule or in the rule itself, is often
a general listing of which costs a prevailing party may recover. 165 This
article proposes placing the following model rule within the rule of civil
procedure addressing which costs are recoverable:
The prevailing party may recover the reasonable costs associated
with the preparation of animations and simulations which the court
deems reasonably necessary. "Animation" and "simulation" as
referred to in this Rule are as defined in subsection (a) of this Rule.
Because of the persuasiveness of animations and simulations, a liti-
gant would nearly always choose to employ one when circumstances
permit. An important aspect of this proposed rule is to encourage parties
who might not otherwise take advantage of these tools to use animations
and simulations.
66
To award costs pursuant to the proposed rule, the court must make
two separate determinations. First, the court must find that the anima-
tion or simulation was "reasonably necessary." If the court decides the
first question affirmatively, the court must determine what portions of
the costs associated with creating the animation or simulation were "rea-
sonable." The court will make both decisions by balancing such factors
as the amount in controversy, the complexity of the issue depicted by the
animation or simulation, usefulness to the trier of fact, the reasonable-
ness of the fees based on an industry review, and other considerations
the court deems relevant. By using the term "reasonable," the court is
necessarily afforded discretion to determine the recoverable amount.
As the incidence of animation use increases, courts are beginning to
deal with whether costs incident to their use are recoverable. 67 A fed-
eral district court in Colorado taxed the defendant almost $23,000 for the
P. § 1032(b) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided by statute, a prevailing party is entitled as a
matter of right to recover costs in any action or proceeding."). In some jurisdictions, however,
entitlement to costs at the trial level is contingent upon an authorizing statute specific to the
action. See, e.g., § 57.111, FLA. STAT. (2006) (regarding costs for businesses in actions initiated
by state agencies); § 61.535, FLA. STAT. (2006) (regarding costs within the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act).
165. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2000); CAL. CODE. Cxv. P. § 1033.5.
166. See supra note 87.
167. See Summit Tech., Inc. v. Nidek Co., 435 F.3d 1371, 1374-78 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Ishida Co.
v. Taylor, No. C-02-1617-JF (PVT), 2004 WL 2713067, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2004);
Glenayre Elecs., Inc. v. Jackson, No. 02 C 0256, 2003 WL 21947112, at *4-6 (N.D. I11. Aug. 11,
2003); In re Air Crash Disaster, Nos. MDL 751, 88-F-664, 1989 WL 259995, at *4 (D. Colo. July
24, 1989) (taxing costs of computer simulation based on information from black box to defendants
as a "reasonably anticipated cost of litigating air crash cases"); Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P. v. MPW
Indus. Servs., Inc., 249 F.3d 1293, 1296-97 (1 1th Cir. 2001); Sci. Applications Int'l Corp. v.
Superior Court, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 337 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (allowing recovery of certain costs
associated with video animation as "possibly fitting with the [civil procedure rule] category of
'models and blowups"').
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costs associated with preparing a "computer-generated graphic simula-
tion of [a] plane crash" created using information obtained from the
plane's "black box."' 168 The court found the exhibit "was necessary for
trial" and awarded costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4). 169 The court further
found that "such demonstrative exhibits are a reasonably anticipated cost
of litigating air crash cases, and thus do not fall within the authorities
cited by defendants."17
The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, has taken a more restric-
tive view of the scope of costs allowable under § 1920(4).171 The
restriction, however, is not the result of the nature of animation, but the
result of the Eleventh Circuit's narrow definition of "exemplification" in
§ 1920(4).172 The Federal Circuit has come to a similar conclusion
under § 1920(4).173
In addition, a California appeals court affirmed the expenses related
to creating a computerized California Highway Patrol video, noting that,
"in the opinion of the trial court, [the video was] reasonably helpful to
the trier of fact and possibly fitting within the category of 'models and
blowups,"' a category explicitly enunciated in the California Code of
Civil Procedure for recoverable costs. 174 The court went on to say that:
Although we endorse the CHP video with less enthusiasm than the
exhibit boards because of associated costs of writing, directing and
filming the video, we cannot rule it out on this basis alone because
the same kind of "creative" design and production expenses go into
the final cost of professional charts and exhibits used in trial
everyday. 1
75
The analogy to other forms of demonstrative evidence is a useful way to
appreciate the categorization of animations and simulations.
By specifically listing the costs associated with producing anima-
168. In re Air Crash Disaster, 1989 WL 259995, at *4.
169. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) states: "A judge or clerk of any court of the United States may
tax as costs the following: . . . (4) Fees for exemplification and copies of papers necessarily
obtained for use in the case."
170. In re Air Crash Disaster, 1989 WL 259995, at *4; see also Glenayre Elecs., Inc., 2003
WL 21947112, at *4-5.
171. Arcadian Fertilizer, L.P., 249 F.3d at 1296-97.
172. Id. at 1297.
173. Summit Tech., Inc. v. Nidek Co., 435 F.3d 1371, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
174. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp. v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 332, 337 (Cal Ct. App.
1995).
175. Id.; see also Ishida Co. v. Taylor, No. C-02-1617-JF (PVT), 2004 WL 2713067, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 2004) (recognizing that the costs associated with animation production can be
recovered under the jurisdiction's rule which allows for "'[t]he cost of preparing charts, diagrams,
videotapes and other visual aids to be used as exhibits' so long as such exhibits 'are reasonably
necessary to assist the jury or the Court in understanding the issues at the trial' ") (quoting N.D.
CAL. Civn L.R. 54-3(d)(5)).
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tions and simulations as a recoverable cost, the proposed rule allows the
court to award such costs without overreaching its discretion. Although
constant changes in technology can make it difficult to continually list
specific items as compensable, with no rule (or case law) explicitly artic-
ulating the court's ability to award such costs, animations and simula-
tions will likely go uncompensated in most circumstances. 176 Due to the
expense of creating animations and simulations, omitting this rule would
likely preclude litigants of modest financial means from hiring a firm
capable of using animations and simulations. This outcome would fos-
ter an already-tarnished perception of our legal system as a system
where the financial status of a litigant is determinative of the litigation's
outcome. 
77
In terms of the costs associated with animations and simulations
allocatable before trial, rules such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4)(c) allow courts the needed flexibility to grant costs for indigent
parties to properly evaluate animations and simulations.' 78 In granting
funding to create animations and simulations for use at trial in criminal
cases, former U.S. District Judge Richard Bilby would allocate indigent
defendants an allowance to match the government's planned technology
expenses. 179 However, no tenable rule-based solution exists in the civil
arena for allocating funds to indigent parties to create an animation or
simulation - the biggest practical stumbling block to their use. 180 As
with most costs, law firms representing such indigent parties can front
176. See Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 337 ("Providing the trial court with
discretion under [the section enumerating allowable costs] in terms of allowance of new categories
of costs is a way of opening a door that would otherwise more often than not be closed.").
177. See Mark I. Pinsky, Jury Out on High-Tech Courtroom, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1993, at AI
(Pinsky noted Los Angeles Superior Court Judge Eli Chernow as indicating that "the latest
advances in technology may give the side with the most money a decisive - and thus unfair -
advantage with juries"); see also D'Angelo, supra note 26, at 580 ("The concern is that the
advancements in computer animation may be 'pricing people out of the system' and denying
justice to those who cannot afford to combat this high-tech tool.").
178. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(c) ("Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall
require that the party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in
responding to discovery under this subdivision; and (ii) with respect to discovery obtained under
subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the court shall require the party seeking discovery to pay the
other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in
obtaining facts and opinions from the expert."); see also Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 42.
In addressing disparate resources, Carbine and McLain suggest:
In the event that an opponent cannot afford to employ a necessary expert, or if the
court itself needs expert assistance, the proposed rule provides that the court may
appoint experts. The court may use its discretion in allocating these costs, so that in
the event of vastly disparate resources, the wealthier party may, in effect, pay for its
opponent's expert.
Id. (referring to MD. RULE 2-504.3).
179. See What Computes in Court, supra note 73, at Cl.
180. See id.
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the costs and then either attempt to retrieve them post-trial through the
proposed rule or have the costs deducted from the award.
7. ANIMATION AND SIMULATION PROCEDURES
IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT
For constitutionally based reasons, many of the proposed model
rule's provisions cannot apply in the criminal context. Due to Sixth
Amendment speedy trial concerns, the proposed notice and objection
periods would likely not pass constitutional muster.1 81  Similarly,
because most jurisdictions have limited criminal discovery, the discov-
ery provisions would have to be adjusted accordingly.' 82 Mandating
disclosure from an accused may also implicate untenable constitutional
difficulties. 83 Furthermore, due process and fairness concerns may
necessitate a pretrial cost allocation system in the criminal arena such as
that used by Judge Bilby in the U.S. District Court for Arizona.'84 At
least one court suggests that the parties' relative resources is a factor that




In a general sense, the rules of evidence apply to animations and
simulations as they would with any other type of evidence. 86 Although
animations are not evidence, the proposed definition providing they be
treated as evidence dispels any ambiguity regarding their relationship
with rules of evidence.
Using animations and simulations implicates a multitude of eviden-
tiary concerns. However, the rules of evidence employed by most juris-
dictions are sufficient to competently address the admission of
animations and simulations.'87 This part addresses the application of
181. See Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 42. See generally 21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal
Law § 1021 (2003).
182. See, e.g., MD. RULE 4-263(b)(5) (allowing for discovery of animations and simulations by
both the defense and the prosecution and referencing Maryland Rule of Procedure 2-504.3).
183. See Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 42 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 20.4 (2d ed. 1992)).
184. See supra Part 111.6.
185. Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1185 (Pa. 2006).
186. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THiRD), supra note 139, § 21.446 ("In general,
the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to computerized data as they do to other types of evidence.").
187. See Serge, 896 A.2d at 1176 ("[B]efore we are too quick to differentiate CGA's
[computer-generated animations] or create a special test for their admission, it must be noted that
the rules for analyzing the admission of such evidence have been previously established. In
particular, a CGA should be treated equivalently to any other demonstrative exhibit or graphic
representation and, thus, a CGA should be admissible if it satisfies the requirements of' the
Pennsylvania rules of evidence.); Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 6-7 (noting that the Rules
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preexisting rules of evidence to animations and simulations in the areas
of hearsay, authentication, relevance, unfair prejudice, jury instructions,
special admissibility requirements for scientific evidence, and viewing
"animations" during jury deliberations, opening statements, and closing
arguments. Because of the peculiarly persuasive nature of animations
and simulations and the volume of evidentiary concerns their use impli-
cates, commentary examining the rules as they apply to animations and
simulations is warranted.
A. Hearsay
Hearsay is generally accepted as "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evi-
dence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." '88 "A 'statement' is (1)
an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is
intended by the person as an assertion."' 89 Of course, a hearsay state-
ment is inadmissible unless authorized by an exception to the hearsay
rule. 
190
An animation, by definition, cannot implicate hearsay concerns
because it is not offered as substantive evidence; that is, it is not offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.' 9' In hearsay terms, an anima-
tion is better described as illustrating a witness's in-court assertion of the
truth of the matter asserted. 92 A simulation, on the other hand, is sub-
stantive evidence offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. How-
ever, because a "statement" as defined in Rule 801 is made by a
"person" rather than a computer, the question arises whether a corn-
Committee responsible for the creation of Maryland Rule of Civil Procedure 2-504.3 "concluded
that the existing rules of evidence adequately deal with the admissibility of computer-generated
evidence").
188. FED. R. EVID. 801(c).
189. FED. R. EvID. 801(a).
190. FED. R. EvID. 802.
191. See Jones v. Kearfott Guidance & Navigation Corp., No. CIV. 93-64(DRD), 1998 WL
1184107, at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 1998) (stating that "[t]he video [animation] is not hearsay as it is
not a statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; rather it is offered to illustrate the
expert witness's theory"); Boyle, supra note 21, at 411 ("Demonstrative evidence does not qualify
as hearsay because it is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted .... It follows that
because the computer animation [ I was used solely as demonstrative evidence .... it is not subject
to the hearsay rule."); Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 9-10 (noting that hearsay concerns are
implicated only for "computer-generated evidence ... offered as substantive evidence"); Ira H.
Leesfield, Maximize the Benefits of Your Electronic Trial Notebook, 1 ATLA ANNUAL
CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS 1009 (2000) (stating that "because demonstrative evidence
is only offered to illustrate the testimony of a witness and is not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted, it is rarely subject to hearsay objections").
192. See Jones, 1998 WL 1184107, at *4; Boyle, supra note 21, at 411; Carbine & McLain,
supra note 12, at 11; Leesfield, supra note 191.
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puter-generated simulation can be subject to the hearsay rule at all. 193
Because a computer-generated simulation (i.e., not a person) is the
source of the statement, a literal reading of the hearsay definition indi-
cates simulations are not subject to the hearsay rule.' 94 One might argue
that courts have impliedly rejected the argument that such computer
statements are exempt from the hearsay rule by applying the hearsay
exception for records of regularly conducted activities,1 95 more com-
monly referred to as the business records exception, to such evidence. 1
96
However, unlike business records where the data entered by the person
is the evidence, in a simulation, although the raw data is entered by a
person, the computer is producing the evidence.
Assuming a court would overlook the fact that a simulation is not a
"person" making a "statement," simulations would still only be subject
to the hearsay rule if considered an out-of-court statement offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. Note that a statement is only
hearsay if it contains an "assertion."' 97 "A statement that is intended to
communicate a thought, idea, or fact is an assertion."' 98 For example,
If a witness testifies that "I saw X buying milk in a supermarket on
January 11," the testimony is not hearsay because X's conduct is not
assertive. X does not intend to communicate - X only intends to buy
the milk. The testimony would be admissible if it was relevant and
not otherwise inadmissible.199
For a simulation to be admissible, the process the computer program is
using to create the simulation must satisfy the Frye/Daubert standard.2"
That means the program creating the simulation is actually illustrating
193. See CHARLES W. EHRHARDT & MASON LADD, FLORIDA EVIDENCE § 801.2 (2003) ("[The
rules regarding hearsay] define[ ] a 'declarant' as being a 'person who makes a statement.' Thus
only statements by persons are treated as hearsay. Evidence not generated by a person, such as
Icaller ID' on a telephone, is not hearsay and is admissible if not excluded by the other
exclusionary rules."). But see Joseph, supra note 97, at 329-30 (opining that "[tihe act of data
entry is an extrajudicial statement - i.e., assertive nonverbal conduct within Rule 801(a)," but
recognizing that "[t]he real question about the data entry function is its accuracy"); Carole E.
Powell, Note, Computer Generated Visual Evidence: Does Daubert Make a Difference?, 12 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 577, 586 (1996) (reasoning that "[o]ne potential problem with [animations and
simulations] is that [they] may be found to be hearsay because the declarant, probably some type
of computer expert, has entered data into the computer and, through the computer, has created an
assertion about the truth of a matter at issue ... or hearsay"). The dissenting commentators have
apparently failed to realize the nature of simulations, namely that the computer program is the
entity creating the evidence, not the technician simply entering data.
194. See EHRHARDT & LADD, supra note 193, § 801.2, at n.10 (citing Bowe v. State, 785 So.
2d 531, 532 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001)) (using the caller I.D. example).
195. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 345 F.3d 928, 935 (6th Cir. 2003).
197. FED. R. EVID. 801(a).
198. EHRHARDT & LADD, supra note 193, § 801.2.
199. Id.
200. See supra Part II.B.4; infra Part IV.F.
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(what the court is satisfied as) reliable scientific, physical, and mechani-
cal principles based on raw data. In likening the above example to a
simulation of the effects of gravity on an inanimate object X, the exam-
ple could be rewritten to read:
If a simulation illustrates that "X acted this way under the effects of
gravity," the simulation is not hearsay because X's actions are not
assertive. X does not intend to communicate - X only acts as the
effects of gravity demand. The simulation would be admissible if it
was relevant and not otherwise inadmissible.
In other words, a simulation is basically a computer's observation of
what occurs when X is subjected to certain physical principles. Because
a simulation contains no assertion, it cannot be subject to a hearsay
objection and, barring other admissibility objections, can be introduced
into evidence.
Case law holding that evidence is admissible when used to illus-
trate scientific principles supports the understanding of simulations as
nonassertive. 20 ' These cases indicate that an illustration depicting scien-
tific principles is not an assertion for hearsay purposes.2 °2 The process
used to create a simulation is based on accepted scientific principles;
hence, a simulation is simply a way of representing the results of a pro-
gram used to illustrate accepted scientific principles. If simulations
were governed under the same principles as other forms of evidence
illustrating scientific principles, they would not be subject to hearsay
objections.
The definition of assertion, coupled with case law allowing the
introduction of evidence illustrating scientific principles, leads to the
conclusion that simulations are not subject to hearsay objections. This is
not to say that because simulations are not hearsay, they are inherently
reliable. The issue of simulation reliability is the very reason procedural
guidelines must be put into place. 20 3 The two-tiered Frye/Daubert anal-
ysis is the proper mechanism to test a simulation's reliability.2 °4
201. See Misener v. Gen. Motors, 165 F.R.D. 105, 107 (D. Utah 1996) (citing nine Tenth
Circuit cases allowing the admission of evidence used to illustrate scientific principles).
202. See, e.g., id. at 106-07 ("[A crash test video] illustrat[ing] relevant principles of
acceleration and gravity forces, inertial forces, and inertial unlatching.... is not hearsay as there
is no assertion."). Most courts, however, have not addressed the issue of hearsay when
introducing evidence illustrating scientific principles. However, because simulations clearly fit
the other elements of the definition of hearsay (i.e., made out of court and offered to prove the
truth of the matter asserted), logic dictates that the reason such evidence is not hearsay is because
they are not assertive (or the simulation is excluded from the hearsay rule because it is not a
"person").
203. See supra Part II.A.
204. The two-tiered Frye/Daubert analysis involves (1) the actual program being subjected to
FryelDaubert, and more importantly (2) the underlying scientific analysis employed by the
program being subjected to Frye/Daubert. See infra Part IV.F. Of course, general authentication
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Several commentators nevertheless suggest that simulations are
subject to hearsay objections and that no specifically enumerated hear-
say exceptions apply. 0 5 Some commentators also suggest that, because
computer-generated simulations do not fit into any hearsay exception,
they can only be entered into evidence through a hearsay catch-all rule -
Federal Rule of Evidence 807 or some variation thereof.2 6 Rule 807
states:
A statement not specifically covered by Rule 803 or 804 but having
equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not
excluded by the hearsay rule, if the court determines that (A) the
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement
is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts;
and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception
unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party suffi-
ciently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party
with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention
to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and
address of the declarant.20 7
Under that analysis, the court would allow the simulation into evidence
only once the court was satisfied that all the Rule 807 factors were
met.20 8 Note that several jurisdictions, Florida for example, do not have
an equivalent of Federal Rule of Evidence 807. Subjecting simulations
to a hearsay requirement in jurisdictions that lack a catch-all provision
would effectively forbid their use in those jurisdictions if simulations
were considered hearsay.
Voice-over narrations complementing animations or simulations
raise their own unique concerns and are properly excluded from evi-
concerns unique to simulations and animations also act to assure a measure of reliability. See
infra Part IV.B.
205. See Boyle, supra note 21, at 411; D'Angelo, supra note 26, at 570-71; Joseph, supra note
97, at 329-30; Leesfield, supra note 191; Powell, supra note 193, at 586.
206. D'Angelo, supra note 26, at 571 ("Because computer animation does not fall under any of
the specific exceptions to the hearsay rule, the proponent must argue admissibility under the
catchall exceptions of Rule 807 (formerly Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5))."); Powell, supra note
193, at 586 ("Because [animations and simulations] do[ ] not fit into any of the enumerated
exceptions [to the hearsay rule], [they] must be shown to fit into the hearsay 'catchall
exceptions."').
207. FEo. R. EViD. 807 (formerly Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5)). See D'Angelo, supra note 26,
at 571-72, for a discussion of how the requirements of Rule 807 would relate to animations and
simulations if applicable.
208. See generally Grimes v. Employers Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607 (D. Alaska 1977)
(applying Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) to a video portraying the daily activities of plaintiff).
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dence. 2°9  Although voice-overs may be properly excluded under the
hearsay rule,210 several cases have excluded animation voice-overs on
the basis that voice-overs tip the Rule 403 balance in favor of exclu-
sion.21 ' However, if the narrator is a witness whose testimony is
reflected in the animation, or an expert properly introducing a simula-
tion, an in-court voice-over would not raise hearsay concerns.212
B. Authentication
Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) states that "[tihe requirement of
authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility
is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims." As discussed in Part ILI.B.4,
animation and simulation authentication involves two separate inquires:
(1) authenticating the underlying program, and (2) authenticating the
animation or simulation as fairly and accurately depicting what it pur-
ports to illustrate or prove. Authentication, of course, is a discretionary
threshold question for the trial judge.21 3
1. AUTHENTICATION OF THE PROCESS USED TO GENERATE
ANIMATIONS AND SIMULATIONS
By definition, the process of generating animations and simulations
will involve some type of computer program. The processes used to
create evidence must be authenticated,2 14 thus the animation or simula-
tion proponent must authenticate the computer program.21 5 In other
words, the proponent must demonstrate that the program used to create
209. See Datskow v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors Aircraft Prod., 826 F. Supp. 677, 685 (W.D.N.Y.
1993); Macaluso v. Pleskin, 747 A.2d 830, 833-35 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000);
Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 52, 82 (C.P. Ct. Lackawanna County 2001).
210. See Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 82 (noting that "the animation [should not] invite hearsay
objections by including extra-judicial commentary such as a pre-recorded narration"); see also
Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 21-22 (stating that "narrations are normally excluded under
the hearsay rule, unless the narrator testifies and is subject to cross examination"); Joseph, supra
note 97, at 335 (asserting that "[b]ecause any prerecorded narration is an extrajudicial statement, a
hearsay exception or exemption is required").
211. Datskow, 826 F. Supp. at 685 ("To reduce the possibility that the jury might interpret [the
animation] as a re-creation of the accident, [the trial judge] also ordered that it be played with the
volume turned off."); Macaluso, 747 A.2d at 835 (finding reversible error in animation due in
large part to the inclusion of extensive pre-recorded narration which made the animation
'testimonial in nature and ... its contents . . . susceptible of being accepted by the jury as
substantive evidence"); Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 81-82.
212. See Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 21-22 (stating that "narrations are normally
excluded under the hearsay rule, unless the narrator testifies and is subject to cross examination").
213. See FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
214. See FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(9).
215. See, e.g., People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 607 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001); Sommervold v.
Grevlos, 518 N.W.2d 733, 738 (S.D. 1994).
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the animation or simulation generates accurate results. This inquiry is
completely separate from whether the actual product (i.e., the animation
or simulation) properly reflects the evidence it purportedly illustrates.
Accordingly, the focus is on the program in general, not on what the
program purports to illustrate or prove. According to Federal Rule of
Evidence 901(b)(9), authentication of a process can be accomplished by
presenting "[e]vidence describing a process or system used to produce a
result and showing that the process or system produces an accurate
result."
Challenging an animation solely on Rule 901(b)(9) grounds is
pointless, as the most important inquiry relating to authentication of ani-
mations is whether the animation properly illustrates the accompanying
testimony. If the animation is a fair and accurate depiction of the evi-
dence it professes to illustrate, the authenticity of the process used to
create the animation is irrelevant. In sum, whether an animation fairly
and accurately represents the accompanying testimony should govern its
authenticity; the court need not resort to an inquiry regarding the pro-
gram used to generate the animation.
On the other hand, challenging a simulation on Rule 901(b)(9)
grounds is an important strategic consideration for opposing parties.
The court will decide the Rule 901(b)(9) contest based on whether the
program used to produce the simulation passes the Frye/Daubert stan-
dard.2 16 Although authentication does not generally involve a Frye!
Daubert analysis, simulations present a unique set of circumstances:
providing the jury with scientific, expert-like substantive evidence cre-
ated by a non-human source. These unique circumstances bring the
Frye/Daubert standard into the realm of Rule 901(b)(9) for simula-
tions.2 17 Thus, to satisfy authentication under Rule 901(b)(9), the pro-
gram underlying the simulation must pass the Frye/Daubert analysis.
2 18
The particular requisites of the Frye/Daubert standard as they relate to
simulations are discussed below in Part IV.F.
216. See supra Part IV.F.
217. This proposition is the result of the hybrid nature of simulations. While the program is an
inanimate object, where threshold admissibility is normally governed by traditional authentication
principles, the program also produces the equivalent of expert-like testimony, where threshold
admissibility is normally governed by the Frye/Daubert standard. This unique situation calls for
an unusual consequence: the Frye/Daubert standard is drawn into the authentication realm (along
with the attendant increase in threshold admissibility).
218. See Joseph, supra note 97, at 334-35 (listing satisfaction of the Frye/Daubert standard as
an authentication issue); see also State v. Sipin, 123 P.3d 862, 868 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
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2. AUTHENTICATION OF ANIMATIONS AND SIMULATIONS AS FAIR AND
ACCURATE DEPICTIONS OF WHAT THEY PURPORT TO REPRESENT
To demonstrate that an animation or simulation "is what its propo-
nent claims," 219 the court must be satisfied that the animation or simula-
tion fairly and accurately depicts what it purports to represent. 220  As
with all pictorial representations,22' most contemporary courts dealing
with animations and simulations have settled on the "fair and accurate"
standard,222 though not necessarily recognizing this inquiry as an
authentication issue. 223  Regardless of the label employed, courts have
followed an authentication framework in determining whether anima-
tions and simulations satisfy the fair and accurate standard.
224
The first step in the authentication process is to produce the experts
and forensic technicians who were involved in the creation process.
These experts and technicians must attest that the animation or simula-
tion is what it purports to be - or, more specifically, that the data from
which the animation or simulation was purportedly created is the data
the experts and technicians put into the animation or simulation.225 A
party challenging an animation or simulation's authenticity might also
219. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
220. See infra notes 218-19; see also Joseph, supra note 97, at 334 (noting that "animations
have been subjected to the fair-and-accurate-portrayal test").
221. See Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806, 809 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the
"fair and accurate" standard is "the same foundation that must be established to admit any
pictorial representation, be it videotape, motion picture, or photograph").
222. See id. at 809 (holding that "the computer animation must be a fair and accurate depiction
of that which it purports to be"); Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 52, 76 (C.P. Ct.
Lackawanna County 2001) (noting that proper authentication requires that the animation be a fair
and accurate depiction of the scene); State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 210 (Tenn. 2001) (explaining
that "as a prerequisite to admissibility, the State must establish that the animation ... fairly and
accurately illustrate[s] and explain[s] the testimony of [the witness]"). Even as far back as 1984,
the court in People v. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d 721, 723 (N.Y. Gen. Term. 1984), recognized that
animations must "fairly and accurately reflect the oral testimony offered."
223. See Bledsoe v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 880 P.2d 689, 692 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1994) (holding that "[a]t a minimum, the proponent must show that the computer simulation fairly
and accurately depicts what it represents"); People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 607-08 (Colo. Ct. App.
2001) (discussing the fair and accurate standard after the court was satisfied that the jurisdiction's
version of Federal Rule of Evidence 901 was satisfied); Cleveland v. Bryant, 512 S.E.2d 360, 362
(Ga. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that, because substantial differences might be prejudicial and
misleading, "a computer-generated animation is admissible if it is a fair and accurate
representation of the scene sought to be depicted"); Farner, 66 S.W.3d at 209 (holding that
because the animation was not a fair and accurate portrayal of the event depicted, its probative
value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice).
224. See supra notes 218-19.
225. See Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 537 (S.C. 2000) ("[A] party may authenticate a
video animation by offering testimony from a witness familiar with the preparation of the
animation and the data on which it is based. In this case, the animation was authenticated by the
testimony of the expert who prepared the underlying data and the computer technician who used
that data to create it.") (emphasis added)).
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dispute whether the computer used to generate the animation was func-
tioning properly. 2 6 In sum, this authentication inquiry assures the data
was not tainted en route to becoming part of the finished product (i.e.,
the animation or simulation). 2 7
The more important aspect of the "fair and accurate" standard is
demonstrating what the name implies - that the animation or simulation
fairly and accurately represents that which it purports to depict.228 Satis-
fying this inquiry can be as simple as having the proper witnesses attest
to that fact. 229 This inquiry, in contrast with authenticating the underly-
ing data, demands that a witness testify that the finished product prop-
erly represents what it purports to depict.
In keeping with the traditional notion that defects in the evidence
go to the weight accorded that evidence and not its admissibility,23 ° sat-
isfaction of the "fair and accurate" standard does not require that the
animation or simulation be exact in every possible detail.23' In fact, one
court allowed an animation that, admittedly, did not conform to the laws
226. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Boston Edison Co., 591 N.E.2d 165, 168 (Mass. 1992);
Kudlacek v. Fiat S.p.A., 509 N.W.2d 603, 617 (Neb. 1994) (citing Commercial Union, 591
N.E.2d at 168); State v. Clark, 655 N.E.2d 795, 812 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (citing Commercial
Union, 591 N.E.2d at 168).
227. See Pierce, 718 So. 2d at 807 (noting that testimony established that the detective's
"measurements were drawn directly onto a computer, such that they were input with no human
contamination of her measurements").
228. See supra notes 218-19.
229. See, e.g., People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 608 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that "[the fair
and accurate] requirement was satisfied when the expert witness stated that she believed the video
[animation] fairly and accurately described shaken baby syndrome, and she agreed with the
prosecutor that the video 'fairly depict[ed] the type of injuries and movements' that cause shaken
baby syndrome"); Pierce, 718 So. 2d at 807 (observing that the detective whose testimony the
animation was to accompany supervised every aspect of the creation of the animation and testified
that the computer animation "fairly and accurately reflected his opinion of how the accident
occurred"); State v. Sayles, 662 N.W.2d 1, 9 (Iowa 2003) (finding that authentication requirement
was satisfied for computer-generated animations where "the doctor knew of the facts represented
by the slide presentation and, in addition, was able to positively state that the slides correctly and
adequately portrayed those facts"); Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 52, 77 (C.P. Ct.
Lackawanna County 2001) (noting that for authentication to be satisfied the law enforcement
personal who gathered the measurements from the crime scene and the experts in ballistics, crime
scene reconstruction, and forensic pathology whose opinions are illustrated by the animation or
simulation must testify).
230. See, e.g., Cauley, 32 P.3d at 607 (noting that "[o]nce authenticity is established, defects in
physical evidence go to the weight of that evidence, not its admissibility").
231. See Datskow v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors Aircraft Prods., 826 F. Supp. 677, 686
(W.D.N.Y. 1993) (explaining that "the various differences between what was shown on the
[computer-animated] tape and the actual conditions of the flight went only to weight to be given to
the animation, not to its admissibility"); Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 537 (S.C. 2000)
(stating that "[the animation] need not be exact in every detail, but the important elements must be
identical or very similar to the scene as described in other testimony and evidence presented by
the animation's proponent in order to constitute a fair and accurate representation").
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of physics.2 32 Furthermore, that the animation or simulation conflicts
with the opposing parties' version of events is not grounds for exclusion,
provided the animation or simulation accurately portrays the proffering
party's version of events.233 However, in terms of authentication, as
long as all other evidentiary requisites are satisfied, animations and sim-
ulations can represent any set of circumstances, as long as testimony
establishes what the animation or simulation purports to depict.234 At
the same time, if an animation or simulation purports to demonstrate a
specific issue, the proponent can authenticate the animation or simula-
tion only with testimony from witnesses sufficiently familiar with that
issue.235
C. Relevance
As with most jurisdictions, the federal rules dictate that "'[rielevant
evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. 2 36 In
other words, "an animation [or simulation] is relevant when it has a
direct bearing upon and tends to establish or make more or less probable
the matter in controversy. 237 In most cases, the relevance of an anima-
tion or simulation can clearly be established.2 38  Although more com-
232. See Constans v. Choctaw Transp., Inc., 97-0863 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/23/97); 712 So. 2d
885, 900.
233. See Bray v. Bi-State Dev. Corp., 949 S.W.2d 93, 100 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Lawson
v. Schumacher & Blum Chevrolet, Inc., 687 S.W.2d 947, 954 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)) (finding the
introduction of a computer-generated chart proper and noting that "'[v]ariances in conditions
which are more detrimental to the proponent of the test than those which existed in the original
will not bar admission"'); Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 78 ("The fact that the proffered animation
may be inconsistent with the defense version of events is not grounds for its exclusion provided
that it accurately portrays the [proffering party's] account of the shooting.").
234. See Robinson v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 16 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding introduction
of accident recreation animation proper where "objections to certain missing or inaccurate details
- for example, lights on the crossing sign, sound, unproven vehicle speeds - do not bear on the
purpose of the exhibit which was to illustrate the expert's theory").
235. See Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Iowa 1994)
(excluding animation of closed-head injury where expert whose testimony the animation was to
illustrate did not demonstrate sufficient knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the accident
causing the injury); Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 73 (opining that "if the animation purports to
contain exact measurements or to be drawn to scale, the party seeking to utilize it must offer
testimony as to how the data was obtained and inputted into the computer").
236. FED. R. EVID. 401.
237. Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 537 (S.C. 2000).
238. But see Macaluso v. Pleskin, 747 A.2d 830, 835 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (finding
that narration accompanying animation of soft tissue injury made animation testimonial in nature
rather than a mere demonstrative aid and "was not relevant to plaintiff's precise medical condition
and included speculation regarding the possible consequences of hypothetical injuries").
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monly used to clarify witness testimony,239 parties have used animations
to demonstrate such issues as specific intent for murder.2 4' As explained
in the following section, the primary purpose of establishing relevance is
to convince the judge that the probative value of the animation or simu-
lation is not outweighed by other factors in favor of its exclusion.
D. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of
Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states that "[a]lthough relevant, evi-
dence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."24' Most states have a similar rule
in their respective evidence codes.242 The particularly persuasive nature
of simulations and animations 24 3 heightens the Rule 403 concern.
244
Note, however, persuasiveness is not the issue; rather, the animation or
simulation's undue effect is the relevant inquiry under Rule 403. Liti-
gants largely have the prerogative to put on the most effective case as
they see fit and courts should not penalize litigants for presenting their
case using persuasive tools such as animations or simulations. 245  Rule
239. See People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 608 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (noting that an animation
was relevant to the expert's opinion regarding the manner in which shaken baby syndrome
injuries occur"); State v. Sayles, 662 N.W.2d 1, 11 (Iowa 2003) (noting how animation depicting
shaken-baby syndrome was relevant to help "the jury in understanding the witness's explanation
of how shaking could cause such severe injuries to an infant"); State v. Clark, 655 N.E.2d 795,
814 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (finding testimony based on computer-generated simulation clearly
relevant to exclude certain positions where the victim could have been shot); Clark, 529 S.E.2d at
537 (explaining that "the animation was relevant because it was related to the testimony of several
witnesses about the accident" and "would have aided the jury in understanding that testimony,
provided it did not have to be excluded on other grounds").
240. See Commonwealth v. Shea, 644 N.E.2d 244, 248 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995) (non-computer-
generated video relevant to the issue of specific intent); Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 78 (animation
relevant to issue of specific intent, specifically to rebut defense contention of self-defense).
241. FED. R. EVID. 403.
242. See, e.g., § 90.403, FLA. STAT. (2006); LA. CODE EviD. art. 403; PA.R.E. 403; S.C. R.
EVID. 403.
243. See supra Part I.B.
244. The court may also exercise control over the use of animations and simulations as
directed by Federal Rule of Evidence 611, which states that "[t]he court shall exercise reasonable
control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1)
make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid
needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue
embarrassment." FED. R. EVID. 611.
245. Compare Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 81 (quoting Galves, supra note 7, at 224) ("Simply
because an attorney or witness is articulate, smart, credible, likable, or even passionate in her
courtroom presentation, her argument or testimony need not be excluded on the Rule 403 ground
that the jury might be 'overwhelmed' by her persuasive trial presentation skills or credible
testimony. We recognize that good argumentation or persuasive testimony does not constitute
1114
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403 is aimed at the improper use of those tools. 246 For example, the
opposing party might suffer undue prejudice if an animation is intro-
duced on the eve of trial, precluding a sufficient opportunity for investi-
gation, 47 or if the animation depicts a gruesome bloody scene. 248 An
animation that is based on data that is not supported by the evidence
should also be excluded. 24 9
Because animations and simulations are often used to capture and
convey complex ideas with great clarity in short periods of time,250 it is
unlikely courts will exclude such evidence as an "undue delay" or a
"waste of time."' 25' Similarly, because of the unique perspectives that
animations and simulations allow,252 it is doubtful that they would be
excluded under Rule 403 as "needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.
253
unfair prejudice. Accordingly, a well-prepared CGE that helps an attorney or witness
communicate persuasively - like good diction, a well-timed dramatic pause, an effective appeal to
an appropriate metaphor, or any other oratory skill - should not be a basis for a Rule 403 unfair
prejudice exclusion. Rule 403 was never intended to exclude the likes of Clarence Darrow simply
because he was effective and persuasive in the courtroom. Therefore, just because a CGE helps a
jury absorb, understand, and believe attorney argument or witness testimony does not mean that
Rule 403 has been violated."), with Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking, Inc., No. 92-3404, 1994
WL 124857, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1994) (excluding animation, apparently solely on basic Rule
403 grounds).
246. But see Van Houten-Maynard v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 89 C 0377, 1995 WL 317056, at
*12 (N.D. Ill. May 23, 1995) (granting motion in limine to exclude animation for lack of notice
and, "under FED. R. EvID. 403[,] by reasons of its great potential for being misleading and
prejudicial"); Racz, 1994 WL 124857, at *5 (excluding an animation solely on Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 grounds and stating "[rielying upon the old adage, 'seeing is believing,' we
conclude that the jury may give undue weight to an animated reconstruction of the accident"). It
does not appear that any other courts have taken such a hard-line view of Rule 403 in relation to
animations or simulations.
247. Subsection (b)(2)(C) of the proposed model rules of procedure discussed in Part III.B.2
explicitly addresses the notice concern.
248. See infra notes 262-66 regarding what sort of accompaniments animations and
simulations can contain.
249. Dunkle v. State, 2006 OK CR 29, 65, 139 P.3d 228, 250 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006).
250. See supra Part I.B.
251. FED. R. EvID. 403. But see Pino v. Gauthier, 633 So. 2d 638, 652 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (in
excluding a simulation, in part, as not helpful to the jury, the court found that "[the expert's]
testimony was clear and understandable. It was not necessary for the jury to view a computer
simulation to understand how a vehicle might lose control during a lane change maneuver"). The
Pino court's reasoning, however questionable, seems more like grounds for exclusion under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 rather than Rule 403. See FED. R. Evio. 702 ("If scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.") (emphasis
added)).
252. See supra note 45.
253. FED. R. EVID. 403; see, e.g., State v. Harvey, 26613-KA (La. App. 2 Cir. 01/25/95); 649
So. 2d 783, 789 (finding that "the animations were not merely cumulative of [the expert's]
testimony, autopsy report, and autopsy pictures" as "they enhanced the jury's understanding" of
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Nonetheless, Rule 403 is the most important rule of evidence for
proponents of animations or simulations to take into account during the
creation process25 4 because, in reported decisions where the animation
or simulation was excluded, the principles behind Rule 403 often pro-
vided the basis for exclusion, regardless of whether the court explicitly
referenced Rule 403.255 Of those cases, some combination of "unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury" was the gen-
eral basis for the Rule 403 exclusion. 56 An animation or simulation is
not misleading simply because it conflicts with the opposing party's ver-
sion of events. 257 Furthermore, although dissimilarities from actual con-
ditions may not affect authentication,258 the jury may be misled if those
differences are not disclosed.2 5 9 However, explaining variations to the
jury can help avoid exclusion on unfairness grounds.2 6°
Any prerecorded narration or voice over as an accompaniment to
the animation or simulation may present an unfair prejudice problem by
unduly bolstering the animation or simulation's legitimacy. 61 Pro-
the evidence); Harris v. State, 2000 OK CR 20, 26, 13 P.3d 489, 496 (Okla. Crim. App. 2000)
(finding that Rule 403 concerns were not implicated where the computer-generated animation
"cleared up the confusion and made the expert's testimony easier to understand").
254. See Kristin L. Fulcher, Comment, The Jury as Witness: Forensic Computer Animation
Transports Jurors to the Scene of a Crime or Automobile Accident, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 55, 70
(1996) (noting that "[p]erhaps the most formidable obstacle faced by the proponent of a computer
re-creation is the balancing process required by Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence").
255. See, e.g., Van Houten-Maynard, v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 89 C 0377, 1995 WL 317056,
at *12 (N.D. I11. May 23, 1995); Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking, Inc., No. 92-3404, 1994 WL
124857, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1994); State v. Basten, No. 97-0918-CR, 1998 WL 61129, at *19
(Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 17, 1998).
256. FED. R. EvID. 403. "Confusion of the issues" should be sufficiently dispelled once
authentication has been satisfied. As one court observed, "[iut is difficult to conceive how a
properly authenticated computer animation could be excluded based upon a 'confusion of the
issues' objection since such a demonstrative exhibit is designed to clarify-not compound-any
potential confusion in an expert's opinion." Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 52, 81
n.6 (C.P. Ct. Lackawanna County 2001). But see Basten, 1998 WL 61129, at *19 (excluding
animation as confusing and misleading to the jury because the main variable upon which it was
based was not verifiable).
257. See Jones v. Kearfott Guidance & Navigation Corp., No. CIV 93-64(DRD), 1998 WL
1184107, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 1998) (finding that, in the context of an animation illustrating an
expert's theory of the cause behind a helicopter crash, "[a] theory or hypothesis that contradicts
one propounded by an opposing party does not become misleading merely because its sets forth a
different perspective").
258. See supra Part IV.B.
259. See Lopez v. Foremost Paving, Inc., 796 S.W.2d 473, 481 (Tex. App. 1990) (finding error
in the admission of non-computer-generated animation where "[t]he jury was not instructed as to
the extent to which it was to consider the videotape in light of factual dissimilarities with the
actual occurrence").
260. See id. at 480-81 (recognizing that "the offering party's affirmative acknowledgement to
the jury of dissimilarities between a videotaped reconstruction and the actual occurrence can serve
to alleviate unfairness").
261. See Datskow v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors Aircraft Prods., 826 F. Supp. 677, 685
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longed exposure to the animation or simulation - i.e., playing the anima-
tion or simulation multiple times - can also negatively impact the Rule
403 analysis.262 Of course, that concern should prompt only a limitation
on the number of times the animation or simulation is shown to the jury,
rather than exclusion of the animation or simulation altogether.
The difficulties associated with recreating subtleties also play a part
in the Rule 403 analysis. Animations and simulations that contain sub-
tleties such as human gestures emulating emotion are likely unduly prej-
udicial because they cannot generally represent such features with
sufficient accuracy. 263 Adding certain features such as sound effects and
blood can also make an animation or simulation overly graphic, leading
to its exclusion under Rule 4 0 3 .26  As a result, several courts have held
that the animation or simulation must be "clinical and emotionless,"
which means the animation or simulation cannot depict facial expres-
sions, blood, or sounds like screams or gunshots.265
(W.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding a video simulation admissible where the court had "ordered that it be
played with the volume turned off, so that the jury could not hear the taped voice-over");
Macaluso v. Pleskin, 747 A.2d 830, 835 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (finding reversible error
in animation due in large part to the inclusion of extensive prerecorded narration which made the
animation "testimonial in nature and ... its contents were susceptible of being accepted by the
jury as substantive evidence"). See also supra Part IV.A for a discussion of narrations as hearsay.
262. See Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806, 810 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (recognizing that
"no undue emphasis [was] placed upon the computer animation videotape, which was shown to
the jury for a total of approximately six minutes during the course of an eleven-day trial"); State v.
Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 210 (Tenn. 2001) (noting that "animations generally have a substantial
impact upon jurors, and that impact is no doubt increased where jurors are allowed to view the
animated visualization not once or twice, but fifteen separate times").
263. See Boyle, supra note 21, at 383-84; Sherman, supra note 20.
264. See Pierce, 718 So. 2d at 810 (noting that "[a]lthough evidence in this case indicated a
bloody scene with screaming victims, the computer animation videotape demonstrated no blood
and replicated no sound. . . . [and] the mannequins used in the computer animation videotape
depicted no facial expressions"); State v. Harvey, 26613-KA (La. App. 2 Cir. 01/25/95); 649 So.
2d 783, 788 (finding Rule 403 concerns over the use of animation alleviated where, inter alia, no
blood was depicted in the animation); Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1183 (Pa. 2006)
(noting that the animation did not include "(1) sounds; (2) facial expressions; (3) evocative or
even life-like movements; (4) transition between the scenes to suggest a story line or add a
subconscious prejudicial effect; or (5) evidence of injury such as blood or other wounds");
Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 52, 82 (C.P. Ct. Lackawanna County 2001) (holding
that "[animations and simulations] should not display any blood or facial expressions or attempt to
replicate the sound of gunshots or other noise").
265. See People v. Hood, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137, 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (finding admission of
simulation proper due, in part, to it being "clinical and emotionless"); State v. Sayles, 662 N.W.2d
1, 11 (Iowa 2003) (finding animation depicting shaken-baby syndrome not unduly prejudicial
where "[t]he animation ... was clinical in nature and the computer-generated infant showed no
facial expression and emitted no sound during the shaking"); Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th at 82
(citing Hood, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 141) (holding that "the [animation or simulation] must be
'clinical and emotionless' ").
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E. Limited Admissibility and Model Jury Instructions
Federal Rule of Evidence 105 states that "[w]hen evidence which is
admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to
another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request,
shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury
accordingly." '266 The limited utility of common demonstrative aids such
as charts and blowups is usually so clear that a limiting instruction
would be inconsequential. However, limited admissibility is important
as it relates to animations because animations are exceptionally persua-
sive and, unlike other demonstrative aids, they are susceptible to being
taken by the jury as more than they are worth.2 67 Unlike simulations,
animations serve solely as an illustration of a witness's testimony - they
have no independent evidentiary value. The jury must be made to
understand that they can only credit the animation as far as they credit
the accompanying witness's testimony.268 As one court described in an
accident reconstruction context, making this distinction clear "is the dif-
ference between a jury believing that they are seeing a repeat of the
actual event and a jury understanding that they are seeing an illustration
of someone else's opinion of what happened. 269
Limiting instructions are also valuable when dealing with simula-
tions. As previously discussed, simulations can be used as either the
basis of an expert's opinion or as a stand alone recreation of events.
Simulations, like animations, are highly persuasive, so the proponent
must explain to the jury exactly what the simulation represents. For
example, if the results of a simulation are the basis of an expert's opin-
ion, this should be explained to the jury. Similarly, the jury should
understand whether the simulation is demonstrating scientific principles
based on data provided by the proponent. Admittedly, because simula-
tions are substantive evidence, a simulation limiting instruction is not as
critical as an animation limiting instruction. Some situations, however,
may call for a limiting instruction. For instance, where the parties con-
test material factual issues, a limiting instruction should accompany any
simulation which is based on those contested material facts.2 7 °
266. FED. R. EvID. 105.
267. See supra Part I.B.
268. Datskow v. Teledyne Cont'l Motors Aircraft Prods., 826 F. Supp. 677, 686 (W.D.N.Y.
1993) (noting that as long as the jury understands the function of an animation "there is no reason
for them to credit the illustration any more than they credit the underlying opinion").
269. Id. (emphasis in original).
270. One commentator suggests that both animations and simulations be accompanied by an
instruction regarding the underlying assumptions upon which they are based. Carbine & McLain,
supra note 12, at 26-27. The model instruction Carbine and McLain propose regarding
assumptions is as follows:
In evaluating what weight, if any, to give to the testimony that relies on the
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One commentator suggests that courts should provide limiting
instructions regarding an animation or simulation's underlying inaccura-
cies. 271 However, opposing counsel will have sufficient opportunity to
clarify all such characteristics for the jury during cross-examination and
closing argument. Of course, the judge has the discretion to issue limit-
ing instructions when the situation calls for them, but in the normal
course of events, the judge need not specifically point out inaccuracies.
Animations and simulations are subjected to scrutiny by the parties in
the form of the procedural rules and other evidentiary rules discussed
above, ensuring that any inconsistencies are acceptable; further instruc-
tion by the judge might do more harm than good.
The only way to effectively communicate an animation or simula-
tion's limited purpose is for the judge to instruct the jury before the
proponent plays the animation or simulation.272  As intimated earlier, a
limiting instruction should accompany all animations, while simulations
will require limiting instructions only under specific circumstances. In
introducing animations, many courts have instructed the jury regarding
the limited purpose the animation purports to serve. 273 Reported instruc-
tions range in length and treatment, but the general purpose is to ensure
the jury understands they should only credit the animation to the extent
they credit the witness's testimony.274
Because animations and simulations vary depending on the particu-
computer [animation] [simulation], bear in mind [the principal assumptions
underlying the exhibit, e.g., that it is predicated on [the party's] version of the facts;
that the facts are in dispute; that the exhibit is no better than the assumptions on
which it rests]. It is for you to decide whether those assumptions are warranted.
Id. (brackets in original). However, because animations are merely a reflection of a witness's
testimony, any underlying assumptions contained in the animation are inherent in the witness's
testimony. The jury, as trier of fact, must weigh the credibility of each witness and their
testimony. Because the animation and the witness testimony are essentially one in the same, an
instruction as to underlying assumptions, in addition to an instruction regarding limited
admissibility, would be superfluous.
271. Id.
272. See John Selbak, Comment, Digital Litigation: The Prejudicial Effects of Computer-
Generated Animation in the Courtroom, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 337, 365 (1994) ("Since juries are
strongly affected by visual evidence, the prejudicial effect of an improper viewpoint shown live in
the courtroom cannot be undone. In these instances, a limiting instruction by the judge, instructing
the jury to disregard the highly-prejudicial image would be largely ineffective.").
273. See, e.g., Datskow, 826 F. Supp. at 684-85 (W.D.N.Y. 1993); Jones v. Kearfott Guidance
& Navigation Corp., No. CIV. 93-64, 1998 WL 1184107, at *5 (D.N.J. Nov. 17, 1998); People v.
Hood, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137, 139 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 608 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2001); State v. Holmes, No. 04-0664, 2005 WL 2989667, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 9,
2005); Commonwealth v. Shea, 644 N.E.2d 244, 247 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995); Clark v. Cantrell,
529 S.E.2d 528, 537 (S.C. 2000).
274. See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806, 810 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (noting with
approval that "it was made clear to the jury that if the information entered into the computer was
inaccurate, then the computer animation itself was inaccurate").
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lar circumstances, a single model instruction cannot fully account for all
animations and simulations. However, a skeleton model of an "anima-
tion limited purpose instruction" would read as follows:
You are about to see a computer-generated animation created by [the
proffering party]. The purpose of the animation is solely to help you
understand the testimony of [the witness]. The animation is not an
actual recreation of [the event]. The animation is not evidence; the
only evidence is the testimony of [the witness]. The animation is
only a visual aid, such as a chart or picture, to help you understand
[the witness's] particular interpretation of [the event]. If you find any
inaccuracies in the testimony the animation is illustrating, then the
animation itself is similarly inaccurate.
Each simulation's underlying assumptions are particularly fact
dependant and, as such, simulations do not lend themselves to a model
limiting instruction. Limiting instructions are intended to make the jury
realize a simulation is not authoritative - that the simulation is simply
used to illustrate a scenario based on facts that may or may not be true.
The jury's job is to determine what the underlying facts are and to
accord the simulation whatever weight they see fit.
F. Requirements for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence:
Frye and Daubert in Relation to Simulations
Animations, as mere illustrations of witness testimony (whether lay
or expert witness testimony), are not subject to a Frye/Daubert analysis.
In contrast, because simulations utilize scientific processes, simulations
are subject to Frye,27 5 Daubert,276 or some variation thereof.277 To sat-
isfy the Frye standard, the proponent of scientific evidence must estab-
lish that his or her expert's theory and method are generally accepted
within the relevant scientific community. 8  On the other hand, in
Daubert the Supreme Court interpreted Federal Rule of Evidence 702,79
275. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
276. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
277. The federal courts are subject to the Daubert standard. Id. See Lustre, supra note 14, for
a review of the various standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence in state courts.
278. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
279. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 is the general rule regarding the admissibility of testimony
by expert witnesses. Rule 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and
(3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case.
FED. R. EVID. 702.
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holding that the proponent of scientific evidence must demonstrate that
the evidence is sufficiently reliable through such factors as: (1) whether
the theory can or has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been sub-
jected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of
error; and (4) general acceptance in the scientific community.28 °
Regardless of the particular standard employed, substantive simula-
tions must satisfy a two-stage Frye/Daubert analysis.28" ' The initial con-
sideration 282  is whether the scientific process the simulation is
purporting to demonstrate is reliable. This consideration transcends the
simulation and should be dealt with like any other scientific evidence.
That the proponent chose to demonstrate the scientific principles via a
simulation is irrelevant to the analysis: the scientific methodology must
satisfy the Frye/Daubert analysis.283 Because this Frye/Daubert consid-
eration is the same for all scientific processes regardless of format, fur-
ther elucidation of this point is outside this Article's scope.2 8 4
The second Frye/Daubert consideration deals directly with the pro-
gramming used to generate the simulation. 85 In general terms, the pro-
gram must satisfy the relevant Frye/Daubert standard.2 86 To do so, the
computer program must reliably simulate the proffered scientific
processes. 287 For example, Newtonian physics is perceived as reliable
under any standard. The Frye/Daubert inquiry for a program utilizing
Newtonian physics is whether the computer program reliably employs
those physical principles. As discussed earlier in Part III.B.4, under the
proposed model rules of procedure, this issue is dealt with during the
pretrial authentication stage. 88
280. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. The court noted that this list is not exhaustive and no one
factor is necessarily decisive. Id. at 593.
281. See supra Part III.B.4.
282. In terms of the practical approach of a litigant dealing with the Frye/Daubert analysis, this
consideration would be dealt with after the next consideration. However, because the analysis
logically flows better in this order, this consideration is discussed first.
283. What exactly must be demonstrated to satisfy the particular Frye/Daubert standard in
terms of scientific process employed is the subject of much debate. Because the debate is not
unique to simulations, the specifics of the argument will not be elucidated any further in this
Article.
284. In other words, the issue may be understood by using a somewhat oversimplified
example: A computer program is used to predict the weather. The computer program uses a
meteorological theory to produce its results. The inquiry under this FryelDaubert consideration is
whether or not the meteorological theory is reliable, regardless of the fact that it was employed by
a computer.
285. See supra Part III.B.4.
286. See, e.g., Livingston v. Isuzu Motors, Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 1473, 1495 (D. Mont. 1995)
(discussing each Daubert factor as it relates to a computer-generated accident simulation).
287. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 52, 76 n.5 (C.P. Ct. Lackawanna
County 2001) (listing programs that would likely pass the Frye/Daubert reliability standard).
288. See FED. R. EviD. 901(b)(9).
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G. Opening Statements and Closing Arguments
By definition, the information relayed in opening statements and
closing arguments is not substantive evidence. 289 Because simulations
are substantive evidence, simulations cannot be introduced during those
times. 29° Nevertheless, opening statements and closing arguments pose
somewhat of a special problem for animations. Parties are normally
allowed to use demonstrative aids during opening and closing, subject to
the court's discretion. Animations, however, are not run-of-the-mill
demonstrative aids.
"[T]he admissibility of demonstrative evidence is a matter within
the discretion of the trial court."29' Similarly, trial courts are vested with
control over the scope of opening statements and closing arguments.292
Thus, even though animations are not demonstrative evidence, the court
has discretion to allow their use during opening statements and closing
arguments.293
That being said, for a party to use any animation or simulation dur-
ing opening statements or closing arguments, he or she must comply
with the relevant provisions of the proposed model rule of procedure.294
If the proffering party complies with all notice and discovery provisions,
the trial judge, at the final pretrial conference, has the discretion to allow
that party to use an animation during their opening statement or closing
argument.295 If, however, the proffering party wishes to use the anima-
289. See Prestige Ford Co. v. Gilmore, 56 S.W.3d 73, 79 (Tex. App. 2001) ("[If a
demonstrative exhibit contains factual information that is not in evidence, it would be error to
show the exhibit to the jury. A party may not make factual statements during closing argument,
whether orally or visually, without any reference to or inference from the evidence."); 75 AM. JUR.
2D Trial § 323 (2006) ("The opening statement of counsel generally is only an outline or a brief
summary of anticipated proof.").
290. Note, however, that this does not completely bar the use of a simulation during opening
statements or closing arguments. Because a simulation contains all the characteristics of an
animation, a simulation can serve the function of both an animation and a simulation. In other
words, the proffering party can call the item an animation for the purpose of opening or closing,
but introduce the item as a simulation during the case in chief. Such a tactic could not result in
surprise for opposing parties as notice, disclosure, etc. is required under the proposed model rules
of procedure.
291. 29A AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 935 (2006); see also ROGER HAYDOCK & JOHN SONSTENG,
TRIAL: ADVOCACY BEFORE JUDGES, JURORS AND ARBrrRATORS § 9.1, at 430 (2d ed. 1999);
MAUET, supra note 31, at 176-77.
292. See, e.g., Smith v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 02-1505 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/28/03); 846 So. 2d
980, 984 ("The trial court is vested with wide discretion in his control of the opening statement.");
75A Am. JUR. 2D Trial § 544 (2006) ("The scope of closing argument is within the sound
discretion of the trial court.").
293. See, e.g., Smith, 846 So. 2d at 984; 75A AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 544 (2006).
294. See Proposed Model Rule of Procedure Regarding the Admission of Animations and
Simulations ("[A]ny party who intends to use an animation or simulation at trial for any purpose




tion only during either opening or closing, the trial judge need only con-
sider those issues attendant to introducing animations in general. On the
other hand, if the proffering party wishes to use the animation multiple
times (e.g., during their opening, case-in-chief, and closing), the trial
judge must also consider whether multiple exposures will cause the jury
to place undue reliance on the animation.
296
It is worth noting that the Maryland rule297 does not apply to ani-
mations or simulations used during opening or closing arguments.
298
According to commentators involved with developing the Maryland
rule:
This result was reached because of concerns as to attorney work
product, and also due to the changing nature of any animation or
depiction to be used in closing, depending on what evidence was
admitted or excluded at trial and on tactical decisions. Whether com-
puter graphics could be shown during opening statements or,
although not having been admitted in evidence, during closing argu-
ments, would be determined by the trial court in its discretion, under
Uniform and Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a).299
The attorney work product to which those authors are referring encom-
passes both materials "prepared in anticipation of litigation" and "the
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attor-
ney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation" as pro-
tected by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3). 3°
Assuming the animation the proffering party uses during opening
statements or closing arguments is the same animation they use during
their case-in-chief, a work product issue never materializes. In other
words, the proponent must comply with the notice and disclosure
requirements to use the animation during their case-in-chief, and, there-
fore, an additional attorney work product concern never arises if the pro-
ponent uses the same animation during their opening statement and/or
closing argument. However, when the proffering party contemplates
using the animation exclusively during their opening statement or clos-
ing argument - for example to generally illustrate their theory of the
case 30 1 - attorney work product difficulties arise. Complying with the
296. See, e.g., State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 210 (Tenn. 2001) (noting that "animations
generally have a substantial impact upon jurors, and that impact is no doubt increased where
jurors are allowed to view the animated visualization not once or twice, but fifteen separate
times").
297. MD. RULE 2-504.3, reproduced infra app. B.
298. Id.; Carbine & McLan, supra note 12, at 36.
299. Carbine & McLain, supra note 12, at 36.
300. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
301. See Borelli, supra note 3, at 450 (noting that animations can "demonstrate[ ] the
plausibility of [the] theory of the case").
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proposed rule of procedure results in a limited waiver of Rule 26(b)(3)
with respect to the contents of the animation. Applying the proposed
rules of procedure where the proffering party intends to use the anima-
tion exclusively during their opening statement or closing argument
would, concededly, limit animation use in those arenas.
Be that as it may, more than just work product concerns arise.
Allowing parties to use animations and simulations unchecked during
their openings and closings would ignore the resulting persuasive
impact; and avoiding that result is the very reason this Article counsels
jurisdictions to adopt the proposed rule of procedure. Though not evi-
dence, openings and closings create a lasting impression for jurors. On
balance, the issues that accompany using animations and simulations in
general also weigh in favor of applying the model rule of procedure to
opening statements and closing arguments.
H. Viewing Animations and Simulations During Jury Deliberations
The potentially enormous persuasive impact of animations and sim-
ulations demands that jurisdictions address whether the jury may bring
animations or simulations into the jury room during deliberations. In
general, demonstrative aids such as animations 30 2 are not entered into
evidence as exhibits and consequently may not be reviewed in the jury
room during deliberations.
Simulations, on the other hand, are substantive evidence and must
be properly admitted into evidence. 3°  Through either explicit procedu-
ral rules or common law, judges in most jurisdictions have discretion to
allow the jury to take certain evidentiary exhibits into deliberations.3 °5
Allowing the jury to view a simulation during deliberations increases the
302. See, e.g., N.D. & S.D. IOWA L.R. 83.7(i) ("The term 'demonstrative aid' includes charts,
diagrams, models, samples, and animations, but does not include exhibits admitted into evidence
or outlines of opening statements or closing arguments.").
303. See, e.g., Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806, 808 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that
"because [the animation] was ruled inadmissible as substantive evidence, it was not permitted to
be taken to the jury room during deliberations"); Cox v. State, 2001-KA-01427-SCT (Miss. 2003);
849 So. 2d 1257, 1274 (concluding "that [a computer-generated animation] which is admitted for
demonstrative purposes only should not be given to the jury for its consideration during
deliberations").
304. See supra Part III.B.1.
305. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.400 ("The court may permit the jury, upon retiring for
deliberation, to take to the jury room... all things received in evidence other than depositions.");
Ky. R. CRiM. P. 9.72 ("Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may take all papers and other things
received as evidence in the case."); Miss. URCCC 3.10 ("The court shall permit the jury, upon
retiring for deliberation, to take to the jury room the instructions and exhibits and writings which
have been received in evidence, except depositions."); State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, 596
(Mo. 1997) ("Even where an exhibit is properly admitted into evidence, the decision whether the
exhibit should be sent back to the jury during deliberations remains a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court.").
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possibility that unfair prejudice might outweigh the simulation's proba-
tive value.3 °6 In sum, the more times the jury views the simulation, the
less apt they are to maintain an objective understanding of the limited
function of the simulation. On balance, these factors weigh against
allowing juries to review simulations during deliberations.
V. CONCLUSION
The additional procedural and evidentiary issues simulations raise
counsel in favor of using animations whenever possible, as they lead to
the path of least resistance while maintaining a very similar impact on
the jury. Rules of procedure and evidence treat animations and simula-
tions as two separate and distinct entities. However, savvy litigators
have realized that, regardless of the scientific methodology employed,
under most circumstances an animation can be used in place of a simula-
tion. That is to say, a litigator could easily plug one program's com-
puter-generated scientific results into a separate program to create an
animation.3 °7 This course of action does not sidestep the general relia-
bility measures that ensure the accuracy of the results, but it does bifur-
cate the admissibility analysis. Furthermore, because the information
experts rely on in forming their opinions need not be admissible, the
simulation program does not necessarily have to brave the rigors of the
Frye/Daubert analysis.3 °8 That said, if an expert uses the underlying
program to form their opinion, the program must still be "of a type rea-
306. See, e.g., State v. Farner, 66 S.W.3d 188, 210 (Tenn. 2001) (noting that "animations
generally have a substantial impact upon jurors, and that impact is no doubt increased where
jurors are allowed to view the animated visualization not once or twice, but fifteen separate
times"); Marcotte, supra note 12, at 56 ("Judges might not allow animation to be shown more than
once for fear of a cumulative effect that repeated showings would have on jurors.").
307. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Porritt, 891 So. 2d 1056, 1059 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
2004) (rejecting argument that video demonstration was merely demonstrative); Lally v.
Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 698 N.E.2d 28, 40 (Mass. App. Ct. 1998) (noting without ruling
on the issue that "[tihe defendants maintain that the animation was not itself a simulation, but
rather, a visual representation of [an expert witness's] testimony concerning the results of one
computer simulation program"); State v Tollardo, 2003-NMCA-122, 8-18, 134 N.M. 430, 434-
36, 77 P.3d 1023, 1027-29.
308. See FED. R. EVID. 703 ("The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert
bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before
the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in
order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible
shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court
determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion
substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect."); see also Pierce, 718 So. 2d at 809 (noting that
"the proponent must establish that the facts or data on which the expert relied in forming the
opinion expressed by the computer animation are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the subject area" and that "[tihe facts or data need not themselves be admissible in evidence").
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sonably relied upon by experts in the particular field."30 9
No matter how the practicalities play out, animations and simula-
tions are finding their way into courtrooms. "Just as the telegraph gave
way to the telephone, the stagecoach gave way to the automobile, and
the typewriter gave way to the word processor, so too will courtroom
chalkboards, easels and blow-up placard charts give way to computer-
generated exhibits."3 0 Progress inevitably marches on - even within
the walls of American courtrooms. We must do our best to ensure juris-
prudence stays abreast of current technology. The set of procedural
rules this Article proposes, coupled with an understanding of the eviden-
tiary issues animations and simulations raise, will ensure that this inexo-
rable transition occurs smoothly and equitably.
309. FED. R. EVID. 703.
310. Commonwealth v. Serge, 58 Pa. D. & C.4th 52, 84 (C.P. Ct. Lackawanna County 2001)




Proposed Model Rule of Procedure Governing the
Admission of Animations and Simulations
(a) Definition - Animation and Simulation
(1) An "animation" is a computer-generated demonstrative aid used
to illustrate a witness's testimony. An animation is the
equivalent of a series of diagrams strung together to produce
what appears to be a moving image. The underlying program
creating an animation may only reproduce images as an illustra-
tion. An animation may not utilize a program that employs for-
mulas to draw conclusions about material issues which would, if
allowed into evidence, only be admissible through qualified
expert testimony. The program may reflect the opinions of
qualified experts, but may not be used to generate those opin-
ions. Although an animation is not substantive evidence and, as
such, is not entered into evidence, its use at trial is governed by
the Rules of Evidence as if it were evidence.
(2) A "simulation" is computer-generated substantive evidence. A
simulation creates a series of diagrams strung together to pro-
duce what appears to be a moving image. A simulation utilizes
one or more programs which, after inputting data, use scientific
formulas to produce conclusions based on that data regarding
issues material to the trial. The results produced by a simula-
tion's programming are equivalent in nature to the opinions
reached by an expert witness.
(b) Notice
(1) Except as provided for in subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) of this
Rule, any party who intends to use an animation or simulation at
trial for any purpose shall file a written notice no later than
ninety days before trial that contains:
(A) a statement as to whether the party intends to use an anima-
tion or simulation;
(B) a descriptive summary of the subject matter of the anima-
tion or simulation including what the animation or simula-
tion intends to illustrate or prove; and
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(C) a statement acknowledging that the party has the responsi-
bility to:
(i) make available any equipment or personnel necessary
to present the animation or simulation to the trial court
and, when requested, any appellate court with compe-
tent jurisdiction;
(ii) make available any equipment or personnel necessary
to present for review the software comprising the sim-
ulation to the trial court and, when requested, any
appellate court with competent jurisdiction; and
(iii) preserve the animation or simulation as provided in
section (e) of this Rule.
(2) If the ninety-day deadline as prescribed in subsection (b)(1) of
this Rule has passed, a party may still use an animation or simu-
lation by filing written notice as provided in (b)(1)(A)-(C) if the
court finds that:
(A) notice as prescribed by (b)(1)(A)-(C) was filed as soon as
practicable;
(B) the decision to employ an animation or simulation was
made as soon as practicable; and
(C) the opposing party or parties will not be unduly prejudiced
by the introduction of the animation or simulation based on
the lack of a ninety-day pretrial notice period.
(3) The notice provisions of this section need not be complied with
where a party intends to use an animation or simulation pre-
pared by or on behalf of a party-opponent for the purpose of
rebuttal or impeachment.
(c) Required Disclosure; Additional Discovery
(1) Within five days after service of notice under section (b) of this
Rule, the proponent of the animation or simulation shall make
available to any party:
(A) the animation or simulation;
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(B) all underlying data and scientific principles upon which the
animation or simulation is based; and
(C) reasonable access to the software used to generate the ani-
mation or simulation.
(2) The filing of notice under section (b) of this Rule entitles any
other party to a reasonable period of time to discover any rele-
vant information needed to oppose the use of the animation or
simulation before the court holds the hearing provided for in
section (d) of this Rule.
(d) Objection Period; Hearing
(1) Within sixty days after service of notice under section (b) of this
Rule, the party:
(A) may file any objection to the use of the animation or simu-
lation at trial; and
(B) shall file any objection based on the assertion that the ani-
mation or simulation does not meet the requirements of
[Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(9) or the equivalent
thereof]. If not so filed, any objection based on a failure to
meet the requirements of [Federal Rule of Evidence
901(b)(9) or the equivalent thereof] is waived unless
excused by the court for good cause.
(2) If an objection is filed under subsection (d)(1) of this Rule, the
court shall hold a pretrial hearing on the objection. If the hear-
ing is an evidentiary hearing, the court may appoint an expert to
assist the court in ruling on the objection and may assess against
one or more parties the reasonable fees and expenses of the
expert. In ruling on the objection, the court may require modifi-
cation of the animation or simulation and may impose condi-
tions relating to its use at trial. The ruling by the court is
definitive under [Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) or the
equivalent thereof]. [Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) or the
equivalent thereof] governs the preservation of claims of error
for appeal.
(e) Preservation of Computer-Generated Animations and Simulations
(1) A party offering an animation at any proceeding shall preserve
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the animation in a form suitable for transmittal as a part of the
record on appeal and furnish it to the clerk of the court.
(2) A party offering a simulation at any proceeding shall preserve
the simulation in a form suitable for transmittal as a part of the
record on appeal and furnish it to the clerk of the court. That
party must also preserve the software used to generate the simu-
lation offered in each proceeding. The party shall give any
appellate court of competent jurisdiction access to the software
as that court so requests.
Provision Regarding Costs
The prevailing party may recover the reasonable costs associated with
the preparation of animations and simulations which the court deems
reasonably necessary. "Animation" and "simulation" as referred to in




Maryland Rule of Civil Procedure - Circuit Court
"Rule 2-504.3. Computer-Generated Evidence
(a) Definition - Computer-Generated Evidence. "Computer-gener-
ated evidence" means (1) a computer-generated aural, visual, or other
sensory depiction of an event or thing and (2) a conclusion in aural,
visual, or other sensory form formulated by a computer program or
model. The term does not encompass photographs merely because they
were taken by a camera that contains a computer; documents merely
because they were generated on a word or text processor; business, per-
sonal, or other records or documents admissible under Rule 5-803 (b)
merely because they were generated by computer; or summary evidence
admissible under Rule 5-1006, spread sheets, or other documents merely
presenting or graphically depicting data taken directly from business,
public, or other records admissible under Rules 5-802.1 through 5-804.
(b) Notice.
(1) Except as provided in subsection (b)(2) of this Rule, any party
who intends to use computer-generated evidence at trial for any purpose
shall file a written notice within the time provided in the scheduling
order or no later than ninety days before trial if there is no scheduling
order that:
(A) contains a descriptive summary of the computer-generated evi-
dence the party intends to use, including (i) a statement as to whether the
computer- generated evidence intended to be used is in the category
described in subsection (a)(1) or subsection (a)(2) of this Rule, (ii) a
description of the subject matter of the computer-generated evidence,
and (iii) a statement of what the computer-generated evidence purports
to prove or illustrate; and
(B) is accompanied by a written undertaking that the party will
take all steps necessary to (i) make available any equipment or other
facility needed to present the evidence in court, (ii) preserve the com-
puter-generated evidence and furnish it to the clerk in a manner suitable
for transmittal as a part of the record on appeal, and (iii) comply with
any request by an appellate court for presentation of the computer-gener-
ated evidence to that court.
(2) Any party who intends to use computer-generated evidence at
trial for purposes of impeachment or rebuttal shall file, as soon as practi-
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cable, the notice required by subsection (b)(1) of this Rule, except that
the notice is not required if computer-generated evidence prepared by or
on behalf of a party-opponent will be used by a party only for impeach-
ment of other evidence introduced by that party-opponent. In addition,
the notice is not required if computer-generated evidence prepared by or
on behalf of a party-opponent will be used only as a statement by a
party-opponent admissible under Rule 5-803 (a).
(c) Required Disclosure; Additional Discovery. Within five days
after service of a notice under section (b) of this Rule, the proponent
shall make the computer-generated evidence available to any party.
Notwithstanding any provision of the scheduling order to the contrary,
the filing of a notice of intention to use computer-generated evidence
entitles any other party to a reasonable period of time to discover any
relevant information needed to oppose the use of the computer-gener-
ated evidence before the court holds the hearing provided for in section
(e) of this Rule.
(d) Objection. Not later than sixty days after service of a notice
under section (b) of this Rule, a party may file any then-available objec-
tion that the party has to the use at trial of the computer-generated evi-
dence and shall file any objection that is based upon an assertion that the
computer-generated evidence does not meet the requirements of Rule 5-
901 (b)(9). An objection based on the alleged failure to meet the
requirements of Rule 5-901 (b)(9) is waived if not so filed, unless the
court for good cause orders otherwise.
(e) Hearing and Order. If an objection is filed under section (d) of
this Rule, the court shall hold a pretrial hearing on the objection. If the
hearing is an evidentiary hearing, the court may appoint an expert to
assist the court in ruling on the objection and may assess against one or
more parties the reasonable fees and expenses of the expert. In ruling on
the objection, the court may require modification of the computer-gener-
ated evidence and may impose conditions relating to its use at trial. The
court's ruling on the objection shall control the subsequent course of the
action. If the court rules that the computer-generated evidence may be
used at trial, when it is used, (1) any party may, but need not, present
any admissible evidence that was presented at the hearing on the objec-
tion, and (2) the party objecting to the evidence is not required to re-state
an objection made in writing or at the hearing in order to preserve that
objection for appeal. If the court excludes or restricts the use of com-
puter-generated evidence, the proponent need not make a subsequent
offer of proof in order to preserve that ruling for appeal.
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(f) Preservation of Computer-Generated Evidence. The party offer-
ing computer-generated evidence at any proceeding shall preserve the
computer-generated evidence, furnish it to the clerk in a manner suitable
for transmittal as a part of the record on appeal, and present the com-
puter-generated evidence to an appellate court if the court so requests.
Committee note: This section requires the proponent of computer-gener-
ated evidence to reduce the computer-generated evidence to a medium
that allows review on appeal. The medium used will depend upon the
nature of the computer-generated evidence and the technology available
for preservation of that computer-generated evidence. No special
arrangements are needed for preservation of computer-generated evi-
dence that is presented on paper or through spoken words. Ordinarily,
the use of standard VHS videotape or equivalent technology that is in
common use by the general public at the time of the hearing or trial will
suffice for preservation of other computer-generated evidence. How-
ever, when the computer-generated evidence involves the creation of a
three-dimensional image or is perceived through a sense other than sight
or hearing, the proponent of the computer-generated evidence must
make other arrangements for preservation of the computer-generated
evidence and any subsequent presentation of it that may be required by
an appellate court."3 1'
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